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Abstract
Drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, we present a novel framework,
constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in resource selection games
(i.e., asymmetric singleton congestion games) with nonatomic players, the coincidence of
strong equilibria and Nash equilibria in such games, and the uniqueness of the cost of each
given resource across all Nash equilibria. Our proofs allow for explicit calculation of Nash
equilibrium and for explicit and direct calculation of the resulting (unique) costs of resources,
and do not hinge on any fixed-point theorem, on the Minimax theorem or any equivalent
result, on linear programming, or on the existence of a potential (though our analysis does
provide powerful insights into the potential, via a natural concrete physical interpretation).
A generalization of resource selection games, called resource selection games with I.D.-
dependent weighting, is defined, and the results are extended to this family, showing the
existence of strong equilibria, and showing that while resource costs are no longer unique
across Nash equilibria in games of this family, they are nonetheless unique across all strong
Nash equilibria, drawing a novel fundamental connection between group deviation and I.D.-
congestion. A natural application of the resulting machinery to a large class of constraint-
satisfaction problems is also described.
Keywords: hydraulic analysis; hydraulic computing; congestion games; nonatomic games;
strong equilibrium; equilibrium properties; potential; physical computing
1 Introduction
Taking which highway would allow me to arrive at my workplace as fast as possible this morning?
Using which computer server would my jobs be completed the soonest? Which router would
deliver my packets with least latency? And even... shopping at which fashion store would make
my clothes as unique as possible? All these, and more, are dilemmas faced by players in resource
selection games — games in which each player’s payoff depends solely on the quantity of players
choosing the same strategy (resource) as that player — and, more generally, in congestion games
— games in which each player chooses a feasible strategy set (e.g., road segments), and, roughly,
aims for its intersections with other chosen strategy sets to be small.
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Congestion games (Rosenthal, 1973; Monderer and Shapley, 1996) have been central to
the interplay between computer science and game theory (Nisan et al., 2007). These games
arise naturally in many contexts and possess various desirable properties; in particular, both
atomic congestion games (where each of the finitely many players has positive contribution to
the congestion) and nonatomic congestion games (where the singular contribution of each of
the continuum of players to the congestion is negligible) possess pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
It is therefore only natural that topics of major interest in the field of Algorithmic Game
Theory, such as the price of anarchy (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999; Papadimitriou,
2001; Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002), which quantifies the social loss in Nash equilibria, have
been introduced in the context of such games.
From a game-theoretic perspective, much additional effort has been spent in introducing
important extensions of congestion games in the context of atomic congestion games, and in
particular in the context of atomic resource selection games. Such efforts include the study
of strong equilibria (stability against group deviations) in various such games (Holzman and
Law-Yone, 1997, 2003; Epstein et al., 2009); player-specific congestion games (Milchtaich, 1996),
where cost functions may be player-specific; and I.D.-congestion games (Monderer, 2006), where
the cost of a resource may depend on the identity (rather than merely on the quantity) of
the players using it. Interestingly, the challenges of dealing with such major extensions in
the nonatomic case have only been partially tackled, largely using only tools generalizing
those developed for atomic games. Indeed, while Milchtaich studies models with player-specific
payoffs (Milchtaich, 2005) and strong equilibria with player-specific payoffs (Milchtaich, 2006;
see Milchtaich, 2004, for a more restricted model), extensions dealing with I.D.-congestion
(where cost depends on the identity of other players using the same resource) have not been
tackled at all, nor have any tools been offered in order to deal with such extensions. This lacuna
is especially puzzling given the centrality of nonatomic congestion games in presenting flow and
communication networks, central to computer science, as well as in presenting large markets
and economies, central to macroeconomics.
In this paper, we deal with such extensions of the study of nonatomic congestion games, and
address the related challenges by introducing a novel analysis approach, which we call hydraulic
computing. Using this approach, which draws intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, in
Section 3 we show the existence of strong equilibria in nonatomic resource selection games,
that strong equilibria and Nash equilibria coincide in such games, and that the cost of each
given resource is unique across all Nash equilibria. Generalizing to I.D.-congestion games, in
Section 4 we show the existence of strong equilibria in resource selection games where the cost of
a resource depends on the identity of the players using it, and that the cost of each given resource
in such games, while interestingly no longer unique across Nash equilibria, is nonetheless unique
across all strong equilibria, drawing a novel fundamental connection between group deviation1
and I.D.-congestion. Our theoretical treatment does not hinge on any fixed-point theorem, on
the Minimax theorem or any equivalent result, on linear programming, or on the existence of a
potential (though it does provide powerful insights into the potential when a potential exists,
via a natural concrete physical interpretation — see Section 3.6.1), and is the first to provide
explicit formulation of the resource cost obtained in equilibria of congestion games. Looking
beyond the realm of games, in Section 5 we show that our framework can serve as a constructive
substitute to linear-programming approaches in other contexts as well, such as that of Hall’s
marriage theorem and many constraint-satisfaction problems generalizing it.
1While coalitional deviations in large-scale economies, such as nonatomic games, require massive coordination
to involve coalitions of nonnegligible measure, we note that such deviations are by no means purely theoretic;
indeed, modern cloud-based social application such as Waze (e.g., for congestion games on graphs) allow for
centralized coordination of deviations of immense scales.
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Atomic Games Atomic congestion games with finitely many players have been introduced
by Rosenthal (1973), who has shown the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in such
games. Monderer and Shapley (1996) later introduced potential games, and showed that they
coincide with congestion games (with finitely many players). Holzman and Law-Yone (1997,
2003) studied strong equilibria in congestion games and characterized settings in which a strong
equilibrium exists; in particular, they showed that the set of strong equilibria and the set of
Nash equilibria coincide in resource selection games (with finitely many players). Milchtaich
(1996) extended congestion games to player-specific congestion games, in which players’ costs
are player-specific, and showed the existence of Nash equilibrium in player-specific resource
selection games (with finitely many players). Monderer (2006) introduced a general class of
I.D.-congestion games, which are congestion games in which the cost of a resource depends
also on the identity of the players using it. On the verge between a finite and a countable
cardinality of players, Milchtaich (2000) showed the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria
(uniqueness of strategies, not only of costs of resources) in large replications of generic finite
resource selection games, as well as in the limit countable-player game.
Nonatomic Games Nonatomic congestion games, such as those that we study, have been
very popular in the computer science context; see, e.g., Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) and
Nisan et al. (2007). In such games, Beckmann et al. (1956) have shown the existence of Nash
equilibrium and the uniqueness of costs of resources in Nash equilibria under certain differentia-
bility assumptions; a general theorem by Schmeidler (1973) implies the existence of Nash equi-
librium under the assumption of continuity (rather than differentiability) of the cost functions.
Milchtaich (2005) characterizes congestion games with player-specific costs in which equilib-
rium resource costs are unique; in particular, he shows that this is the case in resource selection
games with strictly increasing continuous cost functions. Milchtaich (2004, 2006) studies strong
equilibria with player-specific costs, and in particular shows the coincidence of Nash and strong
equilibria in resource selection games with strictly increasing continuous cost functions.
Analogies to hydraulic systems have sporadically appeared in the economics literature in the
past, but seem to be anecdotal in nature. At the end of the nineteenth century, Fisher (1892)
built a complex hydraulic apparatus for calculating Walrasian equilibrium prices in competitive
markets with up to three goods. Kaminsky (2000) (see also Aumann, 2002) uses an analogy
to a simple hydraulic system to find the nucleolus of a small special set of cooperative games.
While of their own interest, we note that it does not seem that any “deep” connection exists
between the ad hoc hydraulic analogies in these papers and our hydraulic framework.
Contributions The main contributions of this paper are:
1. Introducing the hydraulic computing analysis framework.
2. Providing an explicit formula (rather than an iterative procedure of computation) for
calculating the cost of resources in equilibria of nonatomic resource selection games.
3. Proving the uniqueness of equilibrium resource costs without any assumption of differentia-
bility or even continuity; and relaxing the requirement of strict monotonicity of cost func-
tions to weak monotonicity across several key results such as existence of strong equilibria,
equivalence of strong and Nash equilibria, and uniqueness of equilibrium resource costs.
4. Proving the existence of strong equilibria in resource selection games with I.D.-dependent
weighting with continuous cost and weighting functions, and the uniqueness of resource
3
costs across strong equilibria in such games regardless of continuity (showing by example
that these costs are not unique across all Nash equilibria), drawing a novel fundamental
connection between group deviation and I.D.-congestion.
5. Applying hydraulic computing in lieu of linear-programming methods in a large class of
constraint-satisfaction problems, such as generalizations of finding a perfect marriage and
proving Hall’s theorem.
2 Notation
Definition 1 (Notation).
• (Naturals). We denote the strictly positive natural numbers by N , {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
• ([n]). For every n ∈ N, we define [n] , {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• (Reals). We denote the real numbers by R.
• (Nonnegative Reals). We denote the nonnegative reals by R+ , {r ∈ R | r ≥ 0}.
• (Maximizing Arguments). Given a set S and a function f : S → R that attains a maximum
value on S, we denote the set of arguments in S maximizing f by arg Maxs∈S f(s) ,
{s ∈ S | f(s) = m}, where m , Maxs∈S f(s).
• (Simplex). For a set R ⊆ S, we define:
∆R =
{
s ∈ [0, 1]S ∣∣ ∑j∈R sj = 1 & ∀j ∈ S \R : sj = 0}.
(The set S will be clear from context.)
• (Nonempty Subsets). For a set S, we define 2S6=∅ , 2S \ ∅ — the nonempty subsets of S.
Definition 2 (Plateau Height). Let f : R→ R be a nondecreasing function. We say that h ∈ R
is a plateau height of f if there exist x 6= y ∈ R s.t. f(x) = f(y) = h.
Remark 1. A strictly increasing function has no plateau heights.
3 “Standard” Resource Selection Games
3.1 Setting
Definition 3 (Resource Selection). Let n ∈ N. An n-resource selection game is defined by a
pair
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
, where fj : R+ → R is a nondecreasing function for every j ∈ [n], and
µR ∈ R+ for every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅.
In a resource selection game, each R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ indicates a player type. Each player of type R
may consume only from resources in R; the total mass of the continuum of players of type R is
µR. For each resource j ∈ [n], fj is a function from the consumption amount of this resource
to the cost of consuming from the resource. We now formally define these concepts.
Definition 4 (Consumption Profile; µsj ; h
s
j ; Nash Equilibrium). Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a resource selection game.
• A consumption (strategy) profile in G is a function s : 2[n]6=∅ → R
[n]
+ s.t. s(R) ∈ µR ·∆R for
every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅.
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• Given a consumption profile s in G, for every j ∈ [n] we define µsj ,
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅ sj(R) — the
load on (i.e., total consumption from) resource j. Furthermore, we define hsj , fj(µsj) —
the cost of resource j.
• A Nash equilibrium in G is a consumption profile s s.t. for every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ and for every
k ∈ supp(s(R)) and j ∈ R, it is the case that hsk ≤ hsj .
Example 3.1 (A Home Internet / Cellular Market). Consider a scenario in which the resources
are internet service providers (ISPs), and the players are customers on the market for home
internet. (Alternatively, one could think of resources as cellular operators, and of players as
customers on the market for cellular service.) Each customer may choose between the providers
available in this customer’s geographical area, and would like to get a connection with the
largest bandwidth possible given this constraint. µR in this case is proportional to the amount
of customers with possible ISPs R, and for each j ∈ [n], we choose fj s.t. hsj = fj(µsj) is
inversely proportional to the effective bandwidth of each subscriber of ISP j, when there are µsj
subscribers to this ISP.
If each ISP has the same total (i.e., overall) bandwidth, then the speed of the connection
of a single customer subscribed to an ISP is inversely proportional to this ISP’s number of
subscribers, and so obtaining the fastest connection possible is equivalent to subscribing to
a least-subscribed-to ISP, and so this case is captured by setting fj , id for every j ∈ [n].
Generalizing, we may imagine that, say, some ISPs may have different total bandwidths than
others (which may be captured by setting fj(x) , x/bj, where bj is the total bandwidth of
ISP j), or that some ISPs may even purchase some additional total bandwidth as their sub-
scriber pool grows; in either scenario, in order to surf with greatest speed, each customer would
prefer to subscribe not necessarily to a least-subscribed-to ISP (i.e., one with minimal µsj), but
rather to an ISP from which the customer would receive the fastest connection, i.e., one with
minimal hsj = fj(µ
s
j).
The study of stability against group deviations was initiated by Aumann (1959), who con-
sidered deviations from which all deviators gain. Recently, the CS literature considers a consid-
erably stronger solution concept, according to which a deviation is considered beneficial even if
only some of the participants in the deviating coalition gain, as long as none of the participants
lose (see, e.g., Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz, 2006). While stability against the classical all-gaining
coalitional deviation is termed strong equilibrium, this more demanding concept is referred to as
super-strong equilibrium; there are very few results showing its existence in nontrivial settings.
We now formally define both concepts.
Definition 5 (Strong / Super-Strong Nash Equilibrium). Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a
resource selection game and let s be a Nash equilibrium in G. For every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ with µR > 0,
let hR , hsj for every j ∈ supp
(
s(R)
)
. (hR is well defined by definition of Nash equilibrium.)
• s is a strong Nash equilibrium if there exists no consumption profile s′ 6= s s.t. for every
R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ and k ∈ supp
(
s′(R)
)
s.t. s′k(R) > sk(R), it is the case that h
s′
k < h
R.2
• s is a super-strong Nash equilibrium if there exists no consumption profile s′ s.t. for every
R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ and k ∈ supp
(
s′(R)
)
s.t. s′k(R) > sk(R), it is the case that h
s′
k ≤ hR, with
2The minimal coalition that can cause a deviation from s to s′ is the coalition containing, for every type
R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ and resource k ∈ supp
(
s′(R)
)
s.t. s′k(R) > sk(R), a mass of s
′
k(R)−sk(R) players of type R who
consume from k in s′ but not in s.
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hs
′
k < h
R for at least one pair of type R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ and resource k ∈ supp
(
s′(R)
)
.3
Remark 2. Every super-strong Nash equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Formal Results
In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, we constructively prove the following three theorems and corollary.
Theorem 3.1 (∃ Strong Nash Equilibrium). Let G = ((fj)nj=1; (µR)R∈2[n]6=∅) be a resource selec-
tion game. If f1, . . . , fn are continuous, then a strong Nash equilibrium exists in G.
Theorem 3.2 (Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Resource Costs). Let G be an n-resource se-
lection game. hsj = h
s′
j for every j ∈ [n] and every two Nash equilibria s, s′ in G.
Corollary 3.1. Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a resource selection game.
a. (Players are Indifferent between Nash Equilibria). hsk = h
s′
k′ for every k ∈ supp
(
s(R)
)
and
k′ ∈ supp(s′(R)), for every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ and every two Nash equilibria s, s′ in G.
b. (Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Resource Loads). If no two of (fj)
n
j=1 share any plateau
height, then µsj = µ
s′
j for every j ∈ [n] and every two Nash equilibria s, s′ in G.
Theorem 3.3 (All Nash Equilibria are Strong / Super-Strong). Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a resource selection game.
a. All Nash equilibria in G are strong.
b. If hsj is not a plateau height of fj for each j ∈ [n] in any/every Nash equilibrium s, then
all Nash equilibria in G are super-strong.
We significantly generalize all of these results in Section 4. Theorem 3.1 significantly
strengthens a corollary of Schmeidler (1973) that shows existence of a (not-necessarily-strong)
Nash equilibrium for continuous cost functions; Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 strengthen corollaries of
Milchtaich (2004, 2006) that show, for strictly increasing cost functions, existence of a strong
equilibrium and equivalence of super-strong and Nash equilibria. Theorem 3.2 strengthens a
result of Beckmann et al. (1956) that requires differentiability of cost functions, and a result of
Milchtaich (2005) that requires both continuity and strict monotonicity of these functions. We
emphasize that unlike Schmeidler’s and Milchtaich’s proofs, our proof of Theorem 3.1 allows
for explicit calculation of an equilibrium. Indeed, none of our proofs hinge on any fixed-point
theorem, on the Minimax theorem or any equivalent result, on the existence of a potential, or
on linear programming. (Moreover, as shown in Section 5, our results can even replace non-
constructive techniques such as linear programming in certain problems that are traditionally
viewed as unrelated to games.) Similarly, unlike Beckmann et al.’s and Milchtaich’s proofs, our
proof of Theorem 3.2 gives an explicit formula for hsj for every j ∈ [n] (proving the theorem by
noting that this formula does not depend on s). See Section 6 for a discussion of the benefits
of such explicit formulations.
3We require that no member of the minimal coalition described in Footnote 2 lose, but allow the gaining
member to be any player, i.e., even one whose consumption is not necessarily changed. (Indeed, we do not
require that s′k(R) > sk(R) for the pair R and k for which h
s′
k < h
R.)
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3.3 Construction and Hydraulic Intuition
In this section, we intuitively survey the construction underlying our results, as a prelude to
the formal analysis given in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. We start with the special case in which
fj = id for every j ∈ [n], i.e., hsj = µsj for every j ∈ [n] and consumption profile s. Our
hydraulic construction for this case, from which our analysis draws intuition, consists of a system
of containers, interconnected balloons, and pistons, which is illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2.4,5
The intuition underlying our results draws from a number of key observations regarding this
construction (we generalize and formalize these observations in Sections 3.4 and 3.5):
I. If the pistons in a set S (e.g., S = {1, 3} or S = {4}) of containers stop simultaneously,
then at the time of their stopping, no liquid under them can escape to any container in
which the piston has not yet stopped (or else it would do so and the piston above it would
not stop).
II. By Observation I, and as pistons that stop later in time stop at a lower height, in the
resulting consumption profile no player type has any incentive to deviate, and so it is
indeed a Nash equilibrium.
III. If we initially distribute the liquid of each “color” (among the various balloons corre-
sponding to this color) according to some Nash equilibrium (e.g., if we initially distribute
the liquid as in Fig. 1(f)), then the liquid distribution would not change during the entire
process of descent of the pistons. Therefore, each Nash equilibrium may be attained from
some initial liquid distribution.
IV. After pistons 1 and 3 (in Fig. 1) stop, we effectively start over, solving a 3-resource
(2, 4, 5) selection game between all player types whose original acceptable resources were
not merely resource 1 and/or 3.
V. In Fig. 1, pistons 1 and 3 are the earliest to stop. By Observation I above, no part of
the liquid under these pistons when they stop can ever, regardless of the initial liquid
distribution, end up in any container other than 1 or 3. Therefore, these pistons always
stop having under them at least the liquid that is under them in Fig. 1(d), and accordingly
at least at the height at which they stop in Fig. 1(d). By the same observation, the pistons
stopping earliest always stop having under them solely liquid that cannot escape to any
other container, and so, regardless of the initial liquid distribution, if this set were not
pistons 1 and 3, then it would stop below the stopping height of pistons 1 and 3. Therefore,
pistons 1 and 3 always stop earliest, and at the same height. Using Observation IV, an
inductive argument can show that the height at which each piston stops (and the stopping
order) is independent of the initial liquid distribution, and so by Observation III, hsj for
every j ∈ [n] is independent of the choice of Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, by the same
argument, each player always consumes from resources with the same hsj , independently
of the choice of Nash equilibrium s.
4This construction significantly generalizes an ad hoc construction that appears as a secondary auxiliary result
in a previous discussion paper by the authors (Gonczarowski and Tennenholtz, 2014). That discussion paper deals
with combining a highly restricted form of resources selection games (with degenerate strategy sets, i.e., where
µR = 0 for all sets R but those of a very specific form) with facility location games, drawing conclusions regarding
the possibility of false appearance of collusion in internet markets and various food markets.
5This construction may be thought of, in some sense, as a continuous counterpart to the dual greedy algorithm
of Harks et al. (2013), with hydraulic dynamics replacing their “packing oracle”. As we show below, our hydraulic
approach provides important intuition and novel insights (e.g., into the potential), as well as paves the way for
proving a gamut of novel results.
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(a) A set of 5 open-top hollow box containers, cor-
responding, from left to right, to resources 1, . . . , 5,
respectively. For each player type R with µR > 0
(each such type is assigned a distinct color in the
illustration), a balloon, or plastic bag, is placed in
each container j ∈ R. Balloons corresponding to the
same type R are connected via a thin tube emerg-
ing from a narrow slit (not shown) running vertically
along the back of each container, and are jointly filled
with µR liquid.
(b) Pistons are simultaneously lowered through the
top sides of all the containers. As the piston in the
first container reaches the balloons in this container,
they are compressed, causing the balloons connected
to them (i.e., the purple balloon in the third con-
tainer, the blue balloons in the third and fourth con-
tainers, and the light blue balloons in the second,
third, and fifth containers) to inflate.
(c) As the piston in the third container reaches the
balloons in this container, they start to compress as
well, causing, e.g., the interconnected blue balloon
in the fourth container to inflate even faster.
(d) At a certain point in time, no balloon in the first
or third containers can be compressed any further,
as all the liquid in these containers that could have
escaped to other containers has been depleted. The
pistons in the first and third containers halt, and the
remaining pistons continue their descent.
(e) At some later point in time, no balloon in the
fourth container can be compressed any further, as
all the liquid in this container that could have es-
caped to any container other than the first or the
third ones has been depleted.
(f) Eventually, no balloon in the second or fifth con-
tainers can be compressed any further, and the pro-
cess concludes.
Figure 1: (See Fig. 2 for an animated version, which unfortunately cannot be printed.) Illustration of the
construction underlying our analysis, for n = 5 and for fj = id for every j ∈ [5]. E.g., as exactly 87.5% of
the red liquid in Fig. 1(f) is in the second container and the remaining 12.5% is in the fifth container, the
strategy for the player type corresponding to the red color (i.e., R = {2, 5}) in the (super-)strong Nash
equilibrium that we construct is 0.875 ·µ{2,5} consumption from resource 2 and 0.125 ·µ{2,5} consumption
from resource 5; similarly, as all of the blue liquid is in the fourth container, the strategy for the “blue”
type ({1, 3, 4}) in this equilibrium is µ{1,3,4} consumption, solely from resource 4.
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Figure 2: Animated version of Fig. 1; requires Adobe Reader. Click the . button to start the animation.
We note that while the final piston heights (i.e., values of hsj) are independent of the initial
distribution of liquid among connected balloons (i.e., of the choice of Nash equilibrium s), the
final liquid distribution (i.e., players’ strategies) is not; in Fig. 1(f), e.g., any amount of light
blue liquid may be transferred from the second to the fifth container “in exchange for” an
identical amount of red liquid.6
For the general case of arbitrary fj , we intuitively think of replacing the jth box container,
for every j ∈ [n], with a container shaped so that whenever it is filled with any amount µj ∈ R+
of liquid, the resulting surface level would be precisely fj(µj). See Fig. 3 for an illustration. We
emphasize that while the actual construction of such vessels may require that the cost functions
fj meet certain differentiability conditions, our formal proof of Theorem 3.1 only requires conti-
nuity of the cost functions, while our formal proofs of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 and Corollary 3.1 do
not require even that. We note that this continuity assumption (in Theorem 3.1) is in fact not
superfluous; indeed, if even one of the cost functions is discontinuous, then a Nash equilibrium
need not necessarily exist; see Fig. 4 for an example and an illustration.
3.4 Definitions for Formalizing the Observations from Section 3.3
Building upon the intuition of Section 3.3, we formally derive the results of Section 3.2 in Sec-
tion 3.5, with proofs in Appendices A.1 and A.2. In this section, we review the formal definitions
6While this nonuniqueness seemingly contradicts a uniqueness theorem of Orda et al. (1993), we note that
their setting in fact differs from ours; they deal with finitely many players with splittable demand, while we
deal with a continuum of nonatomic players. We furthermore note that their analysis requires that the cost
functions fj be strictly increasing; in their setting, this guarantees uniqueness of both equilibrium loads µ
s
j and
consumptions s, while in our setting, this assumption guarantees solely the uniqueness of equilibrium loads µsj
(without this assumption, we have only uniqueness of equilibrium resource costs hsj); see Corollary 3.1(b).
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(a) x. (b) 2x. (c) Concave. (d) Convex. (e) x+c. (f) min{x, d}.
Figure 3: Containers corresponding to various functions fj . (Assume that the container to the right
of the vessel depicted in Fig. 3(f) is large enough so as to never fill up, yet may only be occupied by
balloons as long as the piston does not pass the tube connecting this container to the main vessel.)
(a) If µs1 < 3 (and so µ
s
2 = 5−µs1 > 2), then
f1(µ
s
1) = µ
s
1 < 3 < µ
s
2 + 1 = f2(µ
s
2).
(b) If µs1 ≥ 3 (and so µs2 = 5−µs1 ≤ 2), then
f1(µ
s
1) = µ
s
1 ≥ 3 > 2 ≥ µs2 = f2(µs2).
Figure 4: No Nash equilibrium exists when n = 2, f1 = id, f2(x) = (x> 2 ? x+1 : x), µ
{1,2} = 5 and
µ{1} = µ{2} = 0. (Assume that the tube connecting the two parts of the second vessel is of zero volume.)
underlying this derivation. Full proofs of all claims given below are given in Appendix A.1.
3.4.1 Communicating-Vessel Equalization
Let S be the set of pistons stopping earliest during the process depicted in Fig. 1. Assume that
when these pistons stop, the total amount of liquid in the respective containers is µ. At what
height did the pistons stop? In this section we formalize the answer to this question.
Definition 6 (Nondecreasing Function to R ∪ {undefined}). Let f : R+ → R ∪ {undefined}.
We say that f is nondecreasing if f |f−1(R) is nondecreasing; i.e., if for every µ < µ′ ∈ R+, if
both f(µ) ∈ R and f(µ′) ∈ R, then f(µ) ≤ f(µ′).
Definition 7 (Communicating-Vessel Equalization). Let m ∈ N and let f1, . . . , fm : R+ →
R ∪ {undefined} be nondecreasing functions.7 We define the function Equalizef1,...,fm : R+ →
R ∪ {undefined} by
µ 7→
{
f1(µ1) ∃µ1, . . . , µm ∈ R+ :
∑m
j=1 µj = µ & f1(µ1) = f2(µ2) = · · · = fm(µm) ∈ R
undefined otherwise.
Remark 3 (Equalizing Multiple Identical Functions). If f1 = f2 = · · · = fm and this function
is defined on all R+, then Equalizef1,...,fm(µ) = f1
( µ
m
)
.
For f1, . . . , fm : R+ → R, one may intuitively think of Equalizef1,...,fm(µ) as exactly the
answer to the question raised above: if f1, . . . , fm are the functions corresponding (see Fig. 3)
7We allow the functions f1, . . . , fm to assume the value undefined for technical reasons that become apparent
in Lemma 2 below. The reader may intuitively think of f1, . . . , fm as real functions until reaching that lemma.
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to the containers of the pistons stopping earliest during the process depicted in Fig. 1, and
if the total amount of liquid in the respective containers when these pistons stop is µ, then
Equalizef1,...,fm(µ) is the height at which these pistons stop; Equalizef1,...,fm(µ) = undefined if
it is impossible that all these pistons simultaneously stop when the total amount of liquid in
these containers is µ. Alternatively and equivalently, if empty containers corresponding (see
Fig. 3) to f1, . . . , fm are connected at their base and the resulting system of communicating
vessels is jointly filled with µ liquid, then Equalizef1,...,fm(µ) is the resulting liquid surface level;
see Fig. 5 for an illustration.
(a) Equalizef1,...,f6(µ) equals the liquid surface level when the containers are jointly
filled with µ liquid.
(b) Equalizef1,...,f6(µ) = undefined, as no distribution of µ liquid between the con-
tainers results in an even liquid surface level across all containers (recall that the
fifth container corresponds to the function x + c for some constant c, and therefore
if it is empty, then its liquid surface level is defined as the level c of its bottom side).
Figure 5: Equalizing the functions from Fig. 3; assume that the connecting tubes are of zero volume.
When two of the functions f1, . . . , fm share a plateau height (cf. Corollary 3.1(b)), then the
liquid distribution µ1, . . . , µm may not be well defined; see Fig. 6 for an illustration. Nonetheless,
(a) (b)
Figure 6: Equalization of two copies of the function from Fig. 3(f), via two distinct liquid distributions.
Formally, when µ > 2d, there exists a continuum of pairs µ1, µ2 ∈ R+ s.t. µ1 +µ2 = µ and min{µ1, d} =
min{µ2, d}. For all such µ1, µ2, it is nonetheless always the case that min{µ1, d} = d = min{µ2, d}, and
so Equalizef1,f2(µ) = d is well defined.
the following lemma shows that the resulting surface level Equalizef1,...,fm is well defined, i.e.,
independent of the chosen liquid distribution µ1, . . . , µm.
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Lemma 1 (Equalization is Well Defined and Nondecreasing). Let m ∈ N and let f1, . . . , fm :
R+ → R ∪ {undefined} be nondecreasing functions. Equalizef1,...,fm is a well-defined nonde-
creasing function from R+ to R ∪ {undefined}.
In the remainder of this section, we derive some additional properties of communicating-
vessel equalization. The following lemma notes that “connecting a single vessel with itself”
has no effect, while connecting several vessels may be done by first connecting subsets of these
vessels into “intermediate vessels”, and only then connecting all “intermediate vessels” together;
it is for the sake of the latter that we have allowed the functions f1, . . . , fm in Definition 7 to
assume the value undefined.
Lemma 2 (Composition of Equalizations). Let m ∈ N and let f1, . . . , fm : R+ → R ∪
{undefined} be nondecreasing functions.
a. Equalizef1 ≡ f1.
b. Equalizef1,...,fm ≡ EqualizeEqualizef1,...,fj1 ,Equalizefj1+1,...,fj2 ,...,Equalizefjk+1,...,fm , for every k ∈
[m] and 1 ≤ j1 < j2 < · · · < jk < m.
Recall that Theorem 3.1 requires that f1, . . . , fn be continuous. (An example in which one
of these functions is discontinuous and no Nash equilibrium exists was given in Fig. 4.) We
therefore conclude this section with an analysis of the equalization of continuous functions.
Definition 8 (Function to R ∪ {undefined}: Continuous / Defined on a Suffix of R+). Let
f : R+ → R ∪ {undefined}.
• We say that f is continuous if f |f−1(R) : f−1(R)→ R is continuous.
• We say that f is defined on a suffix of R+ if for every µ < µ′ ∈ R+, if f(µ) ∈ R, then
f(µ′) ∈ R as well.
Lemma 3 (Equalization of Continuous Functions). Let m ∈ N and let f1, . . . , fm : R+ →
R ∪ {undefined} be nondecreasing functions.
a. If at least one of f1, . . . , fm is continuous, then Equalizef1,...,fm is continuous.
b. If each of f1, . . . , fm is continuous and defined on a suffix of R+, then Equalizef1,...,fm is
continuous and defined on a suffix of R+ as well.
Remark 4 (Equalization of Lipschitz Functions). Let m ∈ N and let f1, . . . , fm : R+ →
R∪ {undefined} be nondecreasing functions. A proof virtually identical to that of Lemma 3(a)
can be used to show that if at least one of f1, . . . , fm is Lipschitz, then Equalizef1,...,fm is
Lipschitz with the same Lipschitz constant.
The following corollary shows that for continuous real functions, the only “reason” for their
equalization to be undefined is of the type depicted in Fig. 5(b), i.e., an uneven bottom of the
corresponding containers.
Corollary 3.2. Let m ∈ N and let f1, . . . , fm : R+ → R be nondecreasing continuous real
functions. Equalizef1,...,fm is a real function iff f1(0) = f2(0) = · · · = fm(0).
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3.4.2 An Explicit Formula for the Highest-Costing Resources and their Cost
Following the discussion in the previous section, if the set of highest-costing resources (highest-
stopping pistons) is P , then by Observation I from Section 3.3, we expect them to cost (stop at
height) EG(P ), where EG is defined as follows.
Definition 9 (EG). Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a resource selection game. We define
EG(S) , Equalize
fk:k∈S
(∑
R∈2S6=∅
µR
)
, for every S ∈ 2[n]6=∅.
A main challenge that remains before moving on to prove the results of Section 3.2, there-
fore, is to find an expression for P , as given such an expression, we could find EG(P ) and
proceed inductively via a formalization of Observation IV from Section 3.3. A natural first
candidate for the role of P may be to take a set of resources with maximal EG, i.e., some
element of arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S), where the value undefined is here and henceforth treated
as −∞ for comparisons by the Max operator. Noticing that for many natural choices of
resource selection games G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
, the set of all such maximizing sets of re-
sources arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) is closed under set union, and therefore contains a greatest element
(namely,
⋃
arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S)), a natural candidate for the role of P would be this greatest
element. While for many natural choices of resource selection games G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
,
this greatest element indeed exists and coincides with the set of highest-costing resources (in-
deed, this is the case when all fj are strictly increasing — see below), this need not generally
be the case. To see that these need not coincide, consider the following example.
Example 3.2 (
⋃
arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) is Not the Set of Highest-Costing Resources). Con-
sider the game G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
, for n = 2, f1 = id, f2(x) = min{x, 2}, µ{1} = 1,
µ{2} = 3, and µ{1,2} = 0. In this game, consumption of each player type {i} solely from re-
source i is the unique consumption profile and hence the unique Nash equilibrium — denote
it by s. Note that hs1 = 1 and h
s
2 = 2, and so 2 is the unique highest-costing resource, albeit⋃
arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) =
⋃{{2}, {1, 2}} = {1, 2}. Indeed, in this case while the set of highest-
costing resources P = {2} is an element in arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) =
{{2}, {1, 2}}, it is not the
greatest element of this set.
In fact, as shown in the following example, the set arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) need not even contain
a greatest element.
Example 3.3 (arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) Has No Greatest Element). Consider the game G =(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
, for n = 3, f1 = f2 = id, f3(x) = min{x, 2}, µ{1} = µ{2} = 1, µ{3} = 3,
and µR = 0 for all nonsingleton R ∈ 2[n]6=∅. It is easy to verify that arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) ={{3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}, and so this set contains no greatest element.
Removing any hope of representing P using some other function of arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S),
the following example shows that the set of highest-costing resources cannot be inferred from
arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) alone.
Example 3.4 (arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) Does Not Determine the Set of Highest-Costing Resources).
Consider the game G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
, for n = 2, f1 = f2 = id, µ
{2} = µ{1,2} = 1,
and µ{1} = 0. In this game, the unique Nash equilibrium s is for all players of type {2} to
consume from resource 2 and for all players of type {1, 2} to consume from resource 1. Note
that hs1 = 1 and h
s
2 = 1, and so the set of highest-costing resources is {1, 2}. We note that
arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) =
{{2}, {1, 2}}, just as in Example 3.2, even though the set of highest-
costing resources in that examples is different.
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Examining Example 3.2, we note that while, indeed, the total mass of all players who
cannot consume from any resource outside {1, 2} in that example, when “equalized” among the
resources in {1, 2}, yields a “height” of 2 = MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) = EG(P ), in fact no consumption
profile corresponds to this equalization, as not enough of these players are allowed to consume
from resource 1.8 To derive a general formula for the set of highest-costing resources, we
therefore need to exclude such “problematic” sets of resources.
Definition 10 (MG; DG; PG; hG). Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a resource selection game.
We define:
• MG(S) ,
{
S′ ∈ 2S6=∅
∣∣∣ ∀µ ≤∑
R∈2S6=∅\2
S\S′
6=∅
µR : Equalize
fk:k∈S′
(µ) 6= EG(S)
}
⊆ 2S6=∅\{S}, for every S ∈ 2[n]6=∅.
A set S′ ∈MG(S) is not allowed for consumption by enough players (out of those who
can consume only from S) to create a consumption profile s.t. only consumers who can
consume solely from S consume from S, and s.t. the cost of each resource in S is EG(S).
In Example 3.2, MG
({1, 2}) = {{1}} while MG({1}) = ∅.
• DG ,
{
S ∈ 2[n]6=∅
∣∣ EG(S) ∈ R & MG(S) = ∅} — these are the sets termed “nonproblem-
atic” above.
• PG ,
⋃
arg Max
S∈DG
EG(S) — we show below that this is precisely the set of highest-costing
resources.
• hG , Max
S∈DG
EG(S) — we show below that this is precisely the cost of every resource in PG.
Remark 5. Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a resource selection game. We show in Ap-
pendix A.1 that in the cases that we study (i.e., where G has a Nash equilibrium or where
f1, . . . , fn are continuous), PG is the greatest element of arg MaxS∈DG EG(S), and so hG =
EG(PG). Furthermore, we show that in these cases hG = MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S); i.e., DG may be
replaced by 2
[n]
6=∅ in the definition of hG. (But not in the definition of PG if even one of fj is not
strictly increasing, by Example 3.2.)
Lemma 4. In every resource selection game G, PG 6= ∅, and hG ∈ R is well defined.
3.4.3 Resource Removal
The following definition will be useful when formalizing Observation IV from Section 3.3.
Definition 11 (Resource Removal). Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a resource selection game
and let S ⊆ [n] be a subset of the resources in G.
• For every R′ ∈ 2[n]\S6=∅ , we define R(R′, G − S) ,
{
R ∈ 2[n]6=∅
∣∣ R \ S = R′} ⊆ 2[n]6=∅ \ 2S6=∅ —
the set of player types in G for whom the allowed resources outside S are precisely R′.9
• We define G − S ,
(
(fj)j∈[n]\S ;
(∑
R∈R(R′,G−S) µ
R
)
R′∈2[n]\S6=∅
)
— the
∣∣[n] \ S∣∣-resource
selection game obtained from G by disallowing any consumption from resources in S and
removing all players who cannot consume from any resource outside S.
8If both f1 and f2 were strictly increasing, then this would imply that EG
({2}) > EG({1, 2}); such an
argument may be used to show that when all fj are strictly increasing, arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) is indeed closed
under set union, and that its greatest element indeed coincides with the set of highest-costing resources.
9We emphasize that R(R′, G− S) is defined as a function of three parameters: R′, G, and S, rather than as
a function of two parameters (R′ and G− S, the latter of which we have not yet defined). We use the notation
R(R′, G− S) rather than R(R′, G, S) solely for readability.
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Lemma 5 (Fundamental Properties of Resource Removal). Let G be a resource selection game.
a. G− ∅ = G.
b. G− S − S′ = G− (S ∪ S′), for every two disjoint subsets S, S′ of the resources in G.
3.5 Formal Derivation of the Results of Section 3.2
In this section, we present our analysis formalizing the observations from Section 3.3 via the
definitions of Section 3.4 and leading to the results of Section 3.2. Full proofs of all the results
of this section are given in Appendix A.1; the subsequent proofs of the results of Section 3.2
are given in Appendix A.2.
3.5.1 Uniqueness and Strength
At the heart of our proof of Theorem 3.2 lies Lemma 6, formalizing Observations I and III
through V from Section 3.3. We note that unlike Theorem 3.1, neither Lemma 6 nor Theorem
3.2 or 3.3 require the continuity of f1, . . . , fn.
Lemma 6 (Uniqueness of Highest-Costing Resources and their Cost). Let s be a Nash equilib-
rium in a resource selection game G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
, and let P s , arg Maxj∈[n] hsj.
a. P s = PG.
b. hsj = hG, for every j ∈ P s.
c. sj(R) = 0 for every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ \ 2P
s
6=∅ and j ∈ P s.
d. The function s′ : 2[n]\P
s
6=∅ → R
[n]\P s
+ , defined by s
′
j(R
′) ,
∑
R∈R(R′,G−P s) sj(R) for every j ∈
[n]\P s and R′ ∈ 2[n]\P s6=∅ , constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the game G−P s. Furthermore,
hsj = h
s′
j for every j ∈ [n] \ P s.
Remark 6. In Lemma 6, The r.h.s. of Parts a and b, and therefore also the quantifications in
Parts b through d and the game defined using resource removal in Part d, are independent of
the choice of s.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 using Lemma 6 is given in Appendix A.2. This proof effectively
follows Algorithm 1, a succinct algorithm (based upon Lemma 6), which, if any Nash equilibrium
exists, directly and explicitly calculates hsj for all j in every Nash equilibrium s (without the
need to first calculate players’ strategies, which are dependent on s).
Full proofs of Corollary 3.1 and Theorem 3.3 are given in Appendix A.2. The former is based
on Theorem 3.2 (as explained in Observation V from Section 3.3), and the latter on the analysis
of Lemma 6, following and formalizing an extension of Observation II from Section 3.3. We
conclude this section by demonstrating that, as suggested by the manner in which Theorem 3.3
is stated, a Nash equilibrium is not necessarily super-strong when the condition of Part b of
this theorem (regarding the plateau heights of the cost functions) is not met.
Example 3.5 (A Not-Super-Strong Equilibrium). Consider the game G=
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
,
for n = 2, f1 = id, f2(x) = min{x, 3}, µ{1} = 1, µ{2} = 2, and µ{1,2} = 3. In this game, a
(strong) Nash equilibrium s is given by {1} 7→ (1, 0), {2} 7→ (0, 2), {1, 2} 7→ (2, 1). (Note
that hs2 = 3 is a plateau height of f2.) This Nash equilibrium is not super-strong, since a
coalition of players of types {1} and {1, 2} can deviate with {1} 7→ (1, 0) (no change) and
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Algorithm 1 Direct computation of hsj for all j ∈ [n], regardless of the choice of Nash equilibrium s.
1: // S is the set of pistons that have already stopped.
2: S ← ∅ // See Lemma 5(a).
3: while S 6= [n] do
4: // By Lemma 6(d), the pistons P that stop next are those that stop earliest in
5: // the
∣∣[n] \ S∣∣-resource selection game G− S.
6: P ← PG−S // By Lemma 6(a).
7: // h is the height at which the pistons P stop.
8: h← hG−S // By Lemma 6(b).
9: for all j ∈ P do
10: hj ← h
11: end for
12: S ← S ∪ P // See Lemma 5(b).
13: end while
14: return (h1, . . . , hn)
{1, 2} 7→ (0, 3) (more players consuming from resource 2), from which no coalition member is
harmed, while coalition members of type {1} benefit. A different deviation showing that this
Nash equilibrium is not super-strong and worth mentioning is of a coalition consisting solely of
players of type {1, 2}, which can deviate with {1} 7→ (1, 2) (by, e.g., some coalition members
switching to consume from resource 2 instead of resource 1 while the others do not change
strategies, or, e.g., by each player of type {1, 2} switching resources), from which no coalition
member is harmed, while the coalition members consuming from resource 1 (whether they have
actually changed strategies or not) benefit.
3.5.2 Existence
We proceed to the proof of existence of equilibrium. A full proof of Theorem 3.1 is given in
Appendix A.2. This proof formalizes Observations I and II from Section 3.3, effectively following
the construction of Fig. 1 and showing that in each step, the pistons stopping are those computed
in Algorithm 1. This is done using the following lemma, constructively showing, even in the
absence of prior knowledge of existence of Nash equilibrium, that the liquid that by Lemma 6(c)
should be under the pistons P when they stop can be distributed appropriately among them,
and that Algorithm 1 indeed finds the sets P in decreasing order of stopping height.
Lemma 7 (PG and hG are Viable as Highest-Costing Resources and their Cost). Let G =(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a resource selection game s.t. f1, . . . , fn are continuous.
a. (Liquid Distribution under PG). There exists a consumption profile s in the |PG|-resource
selection game
(
(fj)j∈PG ; (µ
R)
R∈2PG6=∅
)
, s.t. hsj = hG for every j ∈ PG.
b. (Pistons Stopping Order). If PG 6= [n], then hG > hG−PG.
We remark that the constructive machinery that we develop in Appendix A.1, and in par-
ticular in Appendix A.1.3, in order to prove Lemma 7(a) can also be used to derive a variant
of Algorithm 1 that computes not only the equilibrium resource costs, but also some concrete
equilibium, by using this machinery to compute, in each step of the algorithm, a consumption
profile for all players of types in 2
PG−S
6=∅ such that they all consume from resources in P and such
that the cost of each resource in P is hG−S .
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3.6 Unified, Tangible Intuition and Insights
Several approaches in the literature nonconstructively show the existence of Nash equilibria in
resource selection games by characterizing Nash equilibria as (local) minima of certain functions.
A ramification of these approaches is that every construction that finds a Nash equilibrium in
a resource selection game must minimize these functions (at least locally); in particular, even
though it does not explicitly aim to do so (indeed, these functions do not appear in any of our
proofs or definitions), so does our hydraulic construction. It is interesting to note, though, that
our hydraulic construction does not merely minimize these functions as a “side effect” of finding
a Nash (in fact, strong) equilibrium, but in fact also provides very tangible intuition into these
abstract nonconstructive approaches, and thus, in a sense, unifies the intuition behind these
approaches, which may otherwise be thought of as somewhat detached from one another.
One approach, which is more straightforward to connect to our hydraulic construction, is
that of characterizing Nash equilibria as consumption profiles s for which the resource costs vec-
tor (hsj)
n
j=1, when sorted in nondecreasing order, is (locally) lexicographically minimal (Fotakis
et al., 2009). Indeed, among other properties, our hydraulic system constructively lexicographi-
cally minimizes the sorted vector of resource costs by first minimizing the highest resource cost,
then minimizing the second-highest resource cost, etc. A seemingly-unrelated approach, which
at first glance may seem less straightforward to connect to our hydraulic construction, is that
of characterizing Nash equilibria as consumption profiles minimizing an appropriate potential
function (Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Beckmann et al., 1956), so named due to its properties,
which resemble those of an abstract physical potential. While this approach may at first glance
seem less straightforward to connect to our hydraulic construction, in the following section
we show that our analysis in fact provides powerful insights into the abstract game-theoretic
potential function, via a natural concrete physical interpretation.
3.6.1 Abstract Game-Theoretic Potential as Physical Gravitational Potential
A popular nonconstructive method for proving the existence of Nash equilibrium in resource
selection games (and, more generally, in congestion games) is to define an appropriate potential
function, so named due to its properties, which resemble those of an abstract physical potential.
(The term “potential function”, in this context, is due to Monderer and Shapley (1996), who
used it for atomic congestion games; see Nisan et al. (2007) for details regarding the usage for
nonatomic congestion games, which was originated by Beckmann et al. (1956).) In the notation
of this paper, the proof defines the following scalar function of consumption profiles:
P ∗(s) ,
∑
j∈[n]
∫ µsj
0
fj(x)dx,
and shows that when a single player deviates from one strategy to another, the change in this
player’s cost equals, roughly speaking, the derivative of P ∗ in the direction of the deviation.
The conclusion (under certain assumptions) is that there exists a consumption profile minimiz-
ing P ∗, and that this profile is therefore a Nash equilibrium; in fact, it can be shown that a
consumption profile is a Nash equilibrium iff it minimizes P ∗. We now show that as claimed
above, our hydraulic construction does not merely minimize P ∗ as a “side effect” of finding
a Nash equilibrium, but also gives a natural physical interpretation to P ∗, which justifies the
name “potential function” not only abstractly, but also concretely.
The reader may recall from high-school physics class that the gravitational potential energy
of a point mass of mass m near the surface of the earth is given by mgh, where h is the height of
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the mass, and g is the standard acceleration due to gravity.10 More generally, the gravitational
potential energy of a non-point-mass system may be expressed by the Riemann–Stieltjes integral∫∞
−∞ gh dm(h), where m(h) is the cumulative mass in the system up to height h. In our hydraulic
system, we have ∫ ∞
−∞
gh dm(h) = g
∑
j∈[n]
∫ µsj
0
fj(x)dx = g · P ∗(s),
and so P ∗, up to a multiplicative constant, is precisely the gravitational potential energy of our
system (which our construction therefore turns out to minimize). Perhaps more intuitive to
nonphysicists would be to reason not about the gravitational potential energy of our hydraulic
system, but rather about the height of the center of mass of the system, given by:
1
µ
∫ ∞
−∞
h dm(h) =
1
µ
∑
j∈[n]
∫ µsj
0
fj(x)dx =
P ∗(s)
µ
,
where µ , limh→∞m(h) =
∑
R∈R µ
R is the total mass of the system. Once again, the height
of the center of mass, which our construction turns out to minimize, equals P ∗ up to a multi-
plicative constant.11
We conclude this discussion by noting that the generalization of resource selection games
studied in the next section also demonstrates that hydraulic analysis is by no means confined to
games that can be analyzed via the game-theoretic potential approach. Indeed, even though the
games studied in the next section are generally not potential games in the sense of Monderer
and Shapley (1996), our hydraulic construction naturally extends to solving them. (Indeed,
in that generalized setting, in which the total mass of the system is no longer constant or the
density not uniform, our construction no longer necessarily minimizes the gravitational potential
energy, nor the height of the center of mass, of the system.)
4 Resource Selection Games with I.D.-Dependent Weighting
In this section, we describe an extension of the results of Section 3 to a model where the cost
of a resource may depend on the identity, rather than merely the quantity, of players using it.
While such major extensions have been studied in the context of atomic games, no tools have
been previously offered to tackle them in nonatomic settings.
4.1 Setting
For n, k ∈ N, an n-resource/k-player-type resource selection game with I.D.-dependent weight-
ing is defined by a triple
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (R
i)ki=1; (f
i
j)
i∈[k]
j∈Ri
)
, where fj : R+ → R is a nondecreas-
ing function for every resource j ∈ [n], where Ri ∈ 2[n]6=∅ for every player type i ∈ [k], and
where f ij : [0, 1]→ R+ is an increasing function for every player-type/legal-resource pair (i, j) ∈⋃
i∈[k]{i} × Ri. For each player type i ∈ [k], Ri specifies the set of resources from which this
player type may consume. As before, for each resource j ∈ [n], fj is a function from the
consumption amount of this resource to its cost. The newly introduced functions f ij replace
and generalize the player-type masses µR from Section 3 and indicate the weighting of the
consumption of player type i from resource j (see below).
10As is customary, we ignore the negligible effect of small changes in h on the value of g.
11The reader is referred once again to the special case of our construction that is given in Gonczarowski and
Tennenholtz (2014), which can be more easily and intuitively shown to minimize gravitation potential energy
and height of center of mass.
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A consumption (strategy) profile in this game is a function s : [k] → R[n]+ s.t. s(i) ∈ ∆R
i
for every i ∈ [k], indicating the fraction of players of type i that consume from each resource.
Given a consumption profile s in this game, for every j ∈ [n] we define µsj ,
∑
i:j∈Ri f
i
j
(
sj(i)
)
(note the newly introduced weighting) — the weighted load on (i.e., total weighted consumption
from) resource j. As before, we define hsj , fj(µsj) for every j ∈ [n] — the cost of resource j.
A Nash equilibrium in this game is a consumption profile s s.t. for every i ∈ [k] and for every
` ∈ supp(s(i)) and j ∈ Ri, it is the case that hs` ≤ hsj .
Remark 7. A resource selection game as in Section 3 can be represented as a resource selection
game with I.D.-dependent weighting by defining, for every player type R in the former game
with µR 6= 0, a player type i in the latter game with Ri = R and f ij = µR · id for all j ∈ R = Ri.
So, the setting of this section is indeed a (strict) generalization of resource selection games as
defined in Section 3.
Example 4.1 (A Cloud Computing Market). Consider a scenario in which the resources are
computer servers, and each of the many player wishes to run a relatively small computing job,
where jobs corresponding to players of the same type are of a similar nature. A player of
type i ∈ [k] may choose between the machines Ri, whose hardware is compatible with jobs of
players of this type, and would like for her job to be completed as soon as possible given this
constraint. f ij in this case is a linear function s.t. f
i
j(x) is proportional to the number of cycles of
machine j required to compute the jobs of an x fraction of the players of type i. (The hardware
of each machine may run jobs of some nature more efficiently than jobs of another nature;
e.g., machine 2 may run image-processing jobs faster than text-analysis ones, while machine 3
may run the latter faster than the former.) For each j ∈ [n], we choose fj s.t. hsj = fj(µsj) is
proportional to the number of seconds required for µsj cycles of machine j to complete. (Assume
that the resources of each machine are parallelized between its different users, so that their jobs
are all completed at the same time.)
An additional example for the natural emergence of I.D.-dependent weighting may be given
by analyzing traffic congestion games, where some vehicles, such as trucks, may cause sig-
nificantly higher congestion than cars in narrow roads, while causing only moderately higher
congestion than cars (or even the same congestion) in wide roads.
4.2 Hydraulic Adaptation and Formal Results
Intuitively, the hydraulic construction from Figs. 1 and 2 may be adapted to this generalized
framework by inserting “compressors/expanders” into the tubes between balloons corresponding
to the same player type. E.g., if R1 = {1, 2}, f11 (x) = x and f12 (x) = 2x, then the balloon
system corresponding to player type 1 consists of two balloons, one in container 1 and the other
in container 2, connected by a compressor/expander tube s.t. for each drop of liquid that enters
the tube from the balloon in container 1, two drops exit into the balloon in container 2, and
for every two drops of liquid that enter the tube from the balloon in container 2, one drop exits
into the balloon in container 1.
The first thing that we note about this generalized game is that it no longer holds that
hsj is independent of the choice of Nash equilibrium s; see Fig. 7 for an illustration. Nonethe-
less, if we accept the physical intuition that when compressed via pistons, each of the liquid
distributions given in Fig. 7 eventually reaches the liquid distribution depicted in Fig. 7(d),
then it is intuitively clear why our construction can be formally shown to yield a strong (and
under conditions similar to those of Theorem 3.3(b), super-strong) Nash equilibrium, proving
the existence of such an equilibrium. Consequently, uniqueness of hsj can still be shown to hold
among strong Nash equilibria; this result draws a novel fundamental connection between group
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 7: Liquid distributions among balloons, corresponding to a plethora of Nash equilibria s with
distinct hsj , when n = 2, k = 2 (blue corresponding to i = 1, and red — to i = 2), f1 = f2 = id,
R1 = R2 = {1, 2}, f11 (x) = f22 (x) = x and f12 (x) = f21 (x) = 2x. Only the Nash equilibrium depicted
in Fig. 7(d) is strong (in fact, it is super-strong); this is the unique equilibrium that our hydraulic
construction finds.
deviation and I.D.-congestion, which to the best of our knowledge has never been drawn before
in either nonatomic or atomic resource selection or congestion games. Formally, Theorems 3.1
through 3.3 and Corollary 3.1 generalize as follows.
Theorem 4.1 (∃ Strong Nash Equilibrium). Let G = ((fj)nj=1; (Ri)ki=1; (f ij)i∈[k]j∈Ri) be a resource
selection game with I.D.-dependent weighting. If (fj)
n
j=1 and (f
i
j)
i∈[k]
j∈Ri are all continuous, then
a strong Nash equilibrium exists in G.
Theorem 4.2 (Uniqueness of Strong Equilibrium Resource Costs). Let G be an n-resource
selection game with I.D.-dependent weighting. hsj = h
s′
j for every j ∈ [n] and every two strong
Nash equilibria s, s′ in G.
Corollary 4.1. Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (R
i)ki=1; (f
i
j)
i∈[k]
j∈Ri
)
be a resource selection game with I.D.-
dependent weighting.
a. (Players are Indifferent between Strong Equilibria). hsk = h
s′
k′ for every k ∈ supp
(
s(R)
)
and k′ ∈ supp(s′(R)), for every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ and every two strong Nash equilibria s, s′ in G.
b. (Uniqueness of Strong Equilibrium Resource Loads). If (fj)
n
j=1 are strictly increasing,
then µsj = µ
s′
j for every j ∈ [n] and every two strong Nash equilibria s, s′ in G.
Theorem 4.3 (All Strong Equilibria are Super-Strong). Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (R
i)ki=1; (f
i
j)
i∈[k]
j∈Ri
)
be a resource selection game with I.D.-dependent weighting. If hsj is not a plateau height of fj
for each j ∈ [n] in any/every strong Nash equilibrium s, then all strong Nash equilibria in G
are super-strong.
We note that the conditions of Corollary 4.1(b) (strict monotonicity of cost functions) are
considerably stricter than those of the analogous Corollary 3.1(b) (no two cost functions sharing
a plateau height). As we now show, the weaker conditions of the latter corollary do not suffice
for the former one.
Example 4.2 (Nonuniqueness of Strong Equilibrium Resource Loads When All But One Func-
tion are Strictly Increasing). Consider the game G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (R
i)ki=1; (f
i
j)
i∈[k]
j∈Ri
)
, for n = 2,
k = 2, f1 = id (strictly increasing, and so having no plateau heights), f2(x) = min{x, 1},
R1 = R2 = {1, 2}, f11 (x) = f21 (x) = f12 (x) = x and f22 (x) = 2x. In this game, a strong Nash
equilibrium s is given by 1 7→ (0, 1) and 2 7→ (1, 0). Note that an additional strong Nash equilib-
rium s′ is given by 1 7→ (1, 0) and 2 7→ (0, 1). As Theorem 4.2 predicts, indeed hs1 = 1 = hs
′
1 and
hs2 = 1 = h
s′
2 . Nonetheless, µ
s
2 = 1 6= 2 = µs
′
2 . (In fact, a continuum of strong Nash equilibria
s′′ exist in this game, with µs′′2 attaining all values in [1, 2].)
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4.3 Formal Tools Adaptation
The formal analysis is similar to that of Section 3.5, and is in fact simpler. This seemingly curious
simplicity is due to the nature of the explicit formula for strong equilibrium resource costs that
we obtain in each of the scenarios. In the scenario of Section 3, much of the complexity of our
proof was in order to give the (relatively simple) explicit formula hG = MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) (see
Remark 5), where we recall that EG(S) = Equalizefk:k∈S(
∑
R∈2S6=∅ µ
R) — the communicating-
vessel equalization, among the vessels corresponding to S, of the entire mass of players who
cannot consume from resources outside S. (Recall that the maximum is taken only over sets
S for which EG(S) is defined.) We remark that a bulkier and far less elegant formula, which
is considerably easier to prove, is hG = MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ BG(S), where BG(S) stands for the cost in
a “balanced-cost” strategy profile (i.e., a strategy profile in which all resources have the same
cost) in the game
(
(fj)j∈S ; (µR)R∈2S6=∅
)
. (Again, this maximum is taken only over sets S for
which BG(S) is defined.
12) The former (much simpler) MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) does not explicitly
check whether any of the distributions of the total mass of players
∑
R∈2S6=∅ µ
R that yield an
equalized cost across S is in fact a legal strategy profile, i.e., one that does not assign players to
resources that are illegal for them — the existence of such a legal player distribution is shown in
our proof (see Lemma 7(a) and the results supporting it: Lemmas 15 through 17 and the entire
analysis of Appendix A.1.3) rather than taken as an (unrequired) assumption.13 Unfortunately,
however, in the case of I.D.-depdendent weighting, as each player’s mass changes in a type-
dependent manner with her chosen resource, there is no way to provide an explicit formula for
resource costs without resorting to a formula of the “bulkier” kind14 that we were able to avoid
in Section 3 (it is no longer possible to simply reason about the “sum of the mass”, or the “total
load”, of players who cannot consume from resources outside S), resulting in simpler proofs,
which we defer, along with the full details, to the full paper.
5 Beyond Games
As we have been pointing out above, the development of the machinery of this paper is free
of any fixed-point theorem, of the Minimax theorem and any equivalent result, and of lin-
ear programming. As such nonconstructive techniques are traditionally the tools used when
attempting to establish the existence of equilibria, one may claim that in a sense, hydraulic
analysis “replaces” such techniques in our analysis. It is therefore only natural to ask whether
other results that are traditionally obtained via linear-programming methods can be also be
derived as consequences of our machinery.15 In this section, we show that hydraulic analysis
can indeed serve as a constructive substitute to linear-programming approaches also outside the
realm of games, shedding new light on several flow/linear-programming problems. We start by
deducing a novel, surprisingly intuitive, proof of Hall’s theorem using hydraulic analysis.
12It is easy to verify that EG(S) is defined whenever BG(S) is defined, but not vice versa.
13Such a “bulkier” BG(S) may be seen as somewhat closer in a sense to the “packing oracle” of Harks et al.
(2013).
14In this case, BG(S) is defined as the cost in a balanced-cost strong Nash equilibrium (if such exists) in the
game
(
(fj)j∈S ; (Ri)i:Ri∈2S6=∅ ; (f
i
j )
i:Ri∈2S6=∅
j∈Ri
)
. (For comparison with how BG(S) would have been defined in the
scenario of Section 3, note that when a balanced-cost strong Nash equilibrium exists, then it is a balanced-cost
strategy profile with least cost among all balanced-cost strategy profiles, which may indeed have various costs as
in Fig. 7.)
15This question also naturally arises from noting that a na¨ıve in silico computation of whether a descending
piston is blocked bears a striking resemblance to a search for an augmenting path.
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5.1 Case Study: Application to Hall’s Fractional Marriage Theorem
For this section, let n ∈ N, and for every i ∈ [n], let Ri ⊆ [n]. We consider a scenario involving
n women and n men, where for every i ∈ [n], we interpret Ri as the set of men acceptable to
woman i; a perfect marriage is a one-to-one correspondence M : [n] → [n], where M(i) ∈ Ri
for every i ∈ [n]. For every subset I ⊆ [n], which we interpret as a set of women, we define
RI = ∪i∈IRi — the set of men acceptable to at least one woman in I. A well-known result in
graph theory is the following characterization of the conditions for the existence of a perfect
marriage.
Theorem 5.1 (Hall’s Marriage Theorem (Hall, 1935)). A perfect marriage exists iff |I| ≤ |RI |
for every I ⊆ [n].
We now use the machinery of this paper to prove a slightly weaker form of Theorem 5.1. A
perfect fractional marriage is a function s : [n] → R[n]+ s.t. s(i) ∈ ∆R
i
for every i ∈ [n] and s.t.∑n
i=1 sj(i) = 1 for every j ∈ [n].
Theorem 5.2 (Fractional Version of Hall’s Marriage Theorem). A perfect fractional marriage
exists iff |I| ≤ |RI | for every I ⊆ [n].
To prove Theorem 5.2, we analyze the underlying scenario as a resource selection game.
Let fj , id for every j ∈ [n], let µR ,
∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] ∣∣ Ri = R}∣∣∣ for every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅, and define
G ,
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
— an n-resource selection game. The following two lemmas are
obtained directly from definitions.
Lemma 8. A function s : [n]→ R[n]+ is a perfect fractional marriage iff s is a Nash equilibrium
in G with hsj = 1 for every j ∈ [n].
Proof. By definition, s is a perfect fractional marriage iff s is a consumption profile in G with
hsj = 1 for every j ∈ [n]. A consumption profile s in G with hsj = 1 for every j ∈ [n] is, by
definition, a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 9. A perfect fractional marriage exists iff hsj = 1 for every j ∈ [n] and every Nash
equilibrium s in G.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 8 and Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
Lemmas 8 and 9, in conjunction with the analysis of Section 3, give rise to the following
hydraulic algorithm for finding a perfect fractional marriage (or disproving its existence): set up
the hydraulic system corresponding to G (as in Section 3.3), and start lowering the pistons until
a Nash equilibrium is obtained. If the resulting stopping heights are all 1, then this equilibrium
is a perfect fractional marriage; otherwise, no perfect fractional marriage exists. We use this
algorithm to outline what we consider to be a surprisingly intuitive proof for Theorem 5.2;
we now focus on the “harder” direction of this theorem, i.e., that lack of a perfect fractional
marriage implies that |I| > |RI | for some I ⊆ [n]; the other (trivial) direction is left to the
reader. A succinct formalization of the following argument is given in Appendix A.3.
Proof sketch. Assume that not all stopping heights are 1. Hence, the earliest-stopping pistons,
PG, stop at a height higher than 1. Therefore, there is more than |PG| liquid under the pistons PG
when they stop. Thus, there exists a set I (of all players corresponding to this mass of liquid)
s.t. RI = PG even though |I| > |PG| = |RI |, as required.
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5.2 Beyond Hall’s Theorem
We note that, in fact, the argument presented in Section 5.1 does not require hydraulic analysis,
and can also be carried out using Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 (and our explicit formula for PG) as
black boxes. While we find that phrasing it in terms of hydraulic analysis makes for far more
tangible intuition, this is not the only reason why we have chosen this presentation. Indeed,
as we show in this section, while several generalizations of Hall’s (fractional) theorem can
still be analyzed via a reduction to resource selection games, it may be intuitively simpler to
analyze them directly via hydraulic analysis, and, moreover, even further generalizations can be
hydraulically analyzed while it is not clear how to analyze them using resource selection games
as defined in this paper. (We stress that for ease of exposition, we intentionally do not describe
the most general class of flow/linear-programming problems solvable using our machinery.)
For the remainder of this section, let n, k ∈ N, for every i ∈ [k] let 0 ≤ µi ≤ Mi, for every
j ∈ [n] let 0 ≤ tj ≤ Tj , and for every i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [n], let 0 ≤ mij ≤ M ij . A solution to
the triple
((
[µi,Mi])k
i=1
,
(
[tj , Tj ]
)n
j=1
,
(
[mij ,M
i
j ]
)i∈[k]
j∈[n]
)
is a matrix (qij)
i∈[k]
j∈[n] satisfying all of the
following.
• mij ≤ qij ≤M ij for every i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [n].
• µi ≤∑nj=1 qij ≤Mi for every i ∈ [k].
• tj ≤
∑k
i=1 q
i
j ≤ Tj for every j ∈ [n].
We note that Hall’s theorem deals with the question of the existence of a solution for
µi = Mi = tj = Tj = 1, mij = 0 and M ij = 1Ri(j). (The attentive reader may note that the
scenario described in this section is also a strict generalization of the problem of the satisfiability
of distribution constraints from Appendix A.1.3.)
While it is not hard to find conditions for the existence of such a solution, as well as methods
for efficiently finding such a solution, by formulating an equivalent flow problem, we now analyze
this problem using the hydraulic machinery of this paper.
We note that w.l.o.g. we may assume that mij = 0 for all i and j (otherwise, m
i
j may be
subtracted from mij , µ
i,Mi, tj , and Tj). We first consider an “intermediate” case in which
µi =Mi for every i ∈ [k], tj = Tj for every j ∈ [n], and M ij ∈ {0, µi} (i.e., either forcing qij = 0
or not enforcing any limitation thereon) for every i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [n]. (We assume in this case
that
∑k
i=1 µ
i =
∑n
j=1 tj ; otherwise, no solution can possibly exist.)
While this case may be easily solved using the same machinery as in the previous section, by
setting fj(µ) , µtj and setting µ
R ,
∑
i∈[k]:Ri=R µ
i, where Ri ,
{
j ∈ [n] ∣∣ M ij > 0}, it may also
be directly analyzed using hydraulic analysis without the need to vary the shape of containers.
The main observation that we now make use of is that in the hydraulic algorithm presented
in Section 5.1, it is in fact not necessary to lower the pistons simultaneously. In fact, lowering
them using any timing, as long as all of them eventually reach a height of 1, results in a perfect
fractional marriage, while failing to do so (using any timing) proves the absence of a perfect
fractional marriage. Using this observation, we readily obtain a simpler hydraulic algorithm
for solving the above “intermediate case”: set up a hydraulic system with n containers (all
corresponding to the identity function, as in Section 3.3) and k “liquid colors”, where the
ith liquid color has µi volume and has balloons in all containers j ∈ [n] s.t. M ij > 0. Start
lowering the pistons in any order (say, sequentially) so that for every j ∈ [n], piston j eventually
reaches height tj (or gets blocked from reaching this height). If all pistons successfully reach
their respective desired stopping heights, then the liquid distribution is a solution as required;
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otherwise, no solution exists.16
Let us now consider arbitrary 0 ≤ µi ≤ Mi and 0 ≤ tj ≤ Tj (but not yet arbitrary M ij).
While this scenario may still be analyzed as a resource selection game, the transformation into
such a game becomes increasingly complex: (the verification of the following transformation
into an (n+1)-resource selection game is left to the reader)
fj(µ) ,

µ
tj
µ < tj
1 tj ≤ µ ≤ Tj
µ
Tj
Tj < µ
, fn+1 ≡ 1, µR =
∑
i∈[k]:
Ri=R
µi, µR∪{n+1} =
∑
i∈[k]:
Ri=R
Mi − µi.
Nonetheless, using an argument similar to the one above, the hydraulic algorithm for solving
such a case, while also more complex and with an additional element, is considerably easier to
visualize than the one solving this resource selection game; indeed, it does not require oddly
shaped containers corresponding to functions that are not strictly increasing (as in Fig. 3(f)),
nor does it require the description of how precisely pistons interact with such containers. This
algorithm may be described as follows: set up a hydraulic system with n+1 containers (all
corresponding to the identity function, as in Section 3.3) and 2k “liquid colors”, where the ith
liquid color has µi volume and has balloons in all containers j ∈ [n] s.t. M ij > 0 and where
the (k+i)th liquid color has Mi−µi volume and has balloons in the same containers as the
ith liquid color, and, additionally, in container n+1. Imagine also that container n+1 has no
associated piston, but is “pressurized” so that liquid flows into it only if a currently descending
piston would otherwise get stuck (i.e., only if all space in all other relevant containers is already
occupied). Start lowering the pistons in any order (say, sequentially) so that for every j ∈ [n],
piston j eventually reaches height Tj (or gets stuck in the process). If any piston gets stuck
during this process, then no solution exists. We note that at the end of this process, the
liquid distribution may not (yet) constitute a solution as required, since it is possible that some
container j contains less than tj liquid. Hence (say, one by one), we lower each piston j from
height Tj to height tj , or until it gets stuck in the process. At the end of this process (with
each piston j either at height tj or blocked from reaching this height), if each container j ∈ [n]
contains at least tj liquid (i.e., if each piston touches the liquid surface of its container), then
the liquid distribution is a solution as required; otherwise, no solution exists.
Finally, generalizing to arbitrary M ij (once again assuming w.l.o.g. that m
i
j = 0), while the
corresponding resource selection game would have to be generalized beyond the definition of a
resource selection game as presented in either Section 3 or Section 4, the hydraulic algorithm
may be modified by adding one additional very intuitive “physical” constraint: for every i ∈ [k]
and j ∈ [n], all balloons of liquid color i and of liquid color k+i in container j are wrapped
together in an outer balloon that may not inflate to a height greater than M ij .
We conjecture that hydraulic analysis may indeed yield many more intuitive and visually
appealing proofs for various other linear-programming problems. Can it be applied even beyond
linear-programming problems?
6 Discussion
In addition to proving a gamut of novel theoretical results (in Sections 3 and 4), including some
results that significantly strengthen age-old central theorems, and in addition to constructively
reproving old results (in Section 5), a significant feature of our machinery is that it provides an
explicit expression (see Section 3.4, as well as Lemma 6 in Section 3.5) for the highest resource
16While colored liquids are often solutions, they are not the type of solutions we are interested in.
24
cost (and for the set of highest-costing resources) in equilibrium, which can be sequentially used
(see Algorithm 1 in Section 3.5) to compute all resource costs in equilibrium.
While the benefits of having an explicit expression for resource costs are by far not limited
merely to actual computation, the question of the complexity of such actual computation is
a valid one. The complexity of calculating this expression in practice depends critically on
our ability to compute the equalization Equalizefk:f∈S of any of the cost functions defining the
resource selection game at hand; as with our ability to compute the cost functions themselves,
our ability to compute their equalization strongly depends on the way they are specified. Indeed,
in situations where the mere evaluation of some of the cost functions fj may be costly, it is hard
to expect the calculation of their equalization to be any less costly; on the other hand, in many
naturally occurring scenarios, the calculation of this equalization can be undertaken easily and
efficiently, as is demonstrated in Remark 3 (see, e.g., our proof of Theorem 5.2). Assuming
for a moment that the computation of this equalization can be carried out efficiently, then by
Remark 5, the complexity of calculating the maximum cost (and when fj is strictly increasing
— also the highest-costing resources) is linear in the size of the input (µR)R∈2[n]6=∅ . It should be
noted, though, that in some real-life scenarios, the input is sparse and can be efficiently encoded
into a size considerably smaller than Θ(2n); when no prior information is known regarding the
structure of the input, this may render the complexity of this computation exponential in the
encoded input size.
Nonetheless, as emphasized above, the benefits of having an explicit expression for resource
costs are by far not limited merely to actual computation. Indeed, in Section 5 this explicit
expression is used to phrase an extremely concise proof of Hall’s theorem. For a more elaborate
example, we turn to Gonczarowski and Tennenholtz (2014), where we analyze the dynamics
of a complex two-stage game: in the first stage, merchants choose store locations (some store
locations are accessible to more customers than others, but in turn are associated with higher
real-estate prices), and the second stage is a resource selection game, where each customer
aims to purchase from a least crowded store; the payoffs to the merchants are determined
according to the Nash equilibrium loads in the second-stage resource selection game (these are
well defined by Theorems 3.1 and 3.2). When analyzing game dynamics between the merchants
in this complex multistage game, we must somehow quantify the effect of dynamic changes in
merchants’ strategies in the first stage of the game (i.e., the effect of changes in the availability
of a certain merchant to some customers) on the Nash equilibrium loads in the second-stage
resource selection game; in other words, we must perform a comparative-statics analysis of the
second-stage game. Our explicit expression for resource costs offers a concise way to do precisely
this. (A proof of Proposition 6.1 that directly uses our explicit expression for resource costs
and is free of any reasoning about incentives or deviations is given in Appendix A.4.)
Proposition 6.1 (Comparative Statics: hj as a Function of µ
R). Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a resource selection game s.t. f1, . . . , fn are continuous. For every j ∈ [n] and R ∈ 2[n]6=∅, both
of the following hold, where hj is the cost of resource j in all Nash equilibria of G.
a. hj is continuous and nondecreasing as a function of µ
R.
b. If fj is Lipschitz, then hj is Lipschitz as a function of µ
R, with the same Lipschitz con-
stant.17
17One may compare the elementary tools that we use to derive Proposition 6.1 with the considerably more
complex tools used in Milchtaich (2000) to derive a statement similar in spirit to our Proposition 6.1(b); we
note that Proposition 6.1(a), around which the bulk of our proof of Proposition 6.1 revolves, has no counterpart
following from the analysis of Milchtaich (2000).
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Indeed, a special case of Proposition 6.1 allows us (in Gonczarowski and Tennenholtz, 2014)
to prove powerful results regarding convergence of dynamics in this complex multistage game.
We conclude with a note about hydraulics. As can be seen when examining the extensions of
our machinery in Section 4 and in Section 5.2, our hydraulic analysis framework is both flexible
and robust; indeed, we conjecture that the full extent of its power is yet to be discovered, both
within the realm of games and beyond. The results of this paper, as well as the earlier results
of Fisher (1892), show not only that physical hydraulic systems may be a fruitful source of
intuition for proofs regarding equilibria, but furthermore that they may be used to naturally
“calculate” a variety of flavors of equilibria. It would be interesting to rigorously define a
“hydraulic” calculation, and to study its strength and limitations.
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A Proofs and Auxiliary Results
A.1 Proofs of Lemmas and Corollaries from Sections 3.4 and 3.5, and Aux-
iliary Results
A.1.1 Definitions for Formalizing the Observations from Section 3.3
We begin with an immediate consequence of Definition 6.
Lemma 10. Let m ∈ N and let f1, . . . , fm : R+ → R∪{undefined} be nondecreasing functions.
Let µ1, . . . , µm ∈ R+ s.t. f1(µ1) = f2(µ2) = · · · = fm(µm) ∈ R and let µ′1, . . . , µ′m ∈ R+ s.t.∑m
j=1 µ
′
j ≥
∑m
j=1 µj.
a. If f1(µ
′
1), f2(µ
′
2), . . . , fm(µ
′
m) ∈ R, then there exists j ∈ [m] s.t. fj(µ′j) ≥ fj(µj).
b. If f1(µ
′
1) = f2(µ
′
2) = · · · = fm(µ′m) ∈ R, then f1(µ′1) ≥ f1(µ1).
Proof. For Part a, since
∑m
j=1 µ
′
j ≥
∑m
j=1 µj , there exists j ∈ [m] s.t. µ′j ≥ µj . As fj is
nondecreasing and as µj , µ
′
j ∈ f−1j (R), we have fj(µ′j) ≥ fj(µj), as required. For Part b, by
Part a there exists j ∈ [m] s.t. fj(µ′j) ≥ fj(µj); therefore, f1(µ′1) = fj(µ′j) ≥ fj(µj) = f1(µ1).
Proof of Lemma 1. We start by showing that Equalizef1,...,fm(µ) is well defined for every µ ∈
R+. We have to show that if there exist µ1, . . . , µm ∈ R+ s.t.
∑m
j=1 µm = µ and f1(µ1) =
f2(µ2) = · · · = fm(µm) ∈ R, then f1(µ′1) = f1(µ1) for every µ′1, . . . , µ′m ∈ R+ s.t.
∑m
j=1 µ
′
m = µ
and f1(µ
′
1) = f2(µ
′
2) = · · · = fm(µ′m) ∈ R as well. This follows directly from Lemma 10(b), as
both
∑m
j=1 µm ≤
∑m
j=1 µ
′
m and
∑m
j=1 µ
′
m ≤
∑m
j=1 µm.
The fact that Equalizef1,...,fm is nondecreasing follows directly from Lemma 10(b) as well.
Proof of Lemma 2. Part a follows directly by definition, as when m = 1, we always have µ1 = µ.
We move on to prove Part b; let k ∈ [m] and 1 ≤ j1 < j2 < · · · < jk < m; define j0 , 0 and
jk+1 , m.
If h , Equalizef1,...,fm(µ) ∈ R, then there exist µ1, . . . , µm ∈ R+ s.t.
∑m
j=1 µm = µ and
f1(µ1) = f2(µ2) = · · · = fm(µm) = h. Let i ∈ [k + 1]; as fji−1+1(µji−1+1) = fji−1+2(µji−1+2) =
· · · = fji(µji), we have that Equalizefji−1+1,...,fji (
∑ji
`=ji−1+1 µ`) = fji−1+1(µji−1+1) = h. Hence,
we have h = EqualizeEqualizef1,...,fj1
,Equalizefj1+1,...,fj2
,...,Equalizefjk+1
,...,fm
(
∑k+1
i=1
∑ji
`=ji−1+1 µ`) =
EqualizeEqualizef1,...,fj1
,Equalizefj1+1,...,fj2
,...,Equalizefjk+1
,...,fm
(µ), as required.
Conversely, if h , EqualizeEqualizef1,...,fj1 ,Equalizefj1+1,...,fj2 ,...,Equalizefjk+1,...,fm
(µ) ∈ R, then
there exist µ˜1, . . . , µ˜k+1 s.t.
∑k+1
i=1 µ˜i = µ and Equalizefji−1+1,...,fji
(µ˜i) = h for every i ∈ [k +
1]. Therefore, for every i ∈ [k + 1], there exist µji−1+1, . . . , µji s.t.
∑ji
`=ji−1+1 µ` = µ˜i and
fji−1+1(µji−1+1) = · · · = fji(µji) = h. As
∑m
j=1 µm =
∑k+1
i=1 µ˜i = µ and h = f1(µ1) = f2(µ2) =
· · · = fm(µm), we have that Equalizef1,...,fm(µ) = h, as required.
Proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 2, when proving either part it is enough to consider the case in
which m = 2. (The case m = 1 follows from Lemma 2(a), while the case m > 2 follows from
the case m = 2 by iteratively applying Lemma 2(b).)
We start by proving Part a. Let µ ∈ R+ s.t. h , Equalizef1,f2(µ) ∈ R and let ε > 0; assume
w.l.o.g. that f1 is continuous. By definition of h, there exists µ1 ∈ [0, µ] s.t. f1(µ1) = f2(µ−µ1) =
h. By continuity of f1, there exists δ > 0 s.t. |f1(µ′)−h| < ε for every µ′ ∈ (µ−δ, µ+δ)∩f−11 (R).
Let µ′ ∈ (µ − δ, µ + δ) ∩ Equalize−1f1,f2(R); by definition, there exists µ′1 ∈ [0, µ′] s.t. f1(µ′1) =
f2(µ
′ − µ′1) = h′ , Equalizef1,f2(µ′). If h′ = h, then we trivially have |h′ − h| = 0 < ε, as
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required; assume, therefore, that h′ 6= h. We show that µ′1 ∈ (µ1 − δ, µ1 + δ) by considering
two cases. If h′ > h, then as f1, f2 are nondecreasing and as f1(µ1) = h < h′ = f1(µ′1) and
f2(µ − µ1) = h < h′ = f1(µ′ − µ′1), we have µ1 < µ′1 and µ − µ1 < µ′ − µ′1; combining
these, we have that µ′1 ∈ (µ1, µ1 + µ′ − µ) ⊆ (µ1, µ1 + δ) ⊆ (µ1 − δ, µ1 + δ) in this case.
If h′ < h, then similarly, as f1, f2 are nondecreasing and as f1(µ1) = h > h′ = f1(µ′1) and
f2(µ − µ1) = h > h′ = f1(µ′ − µ′1), we have µ1 > µ′1 and µ − µ1 > µ′ − µ′1; combining these,
we have that µ′1 ∈ (µ1 + µ′ − µ, µ1) ⊆ (µ1 − δ, µ1) ⊆ (µ1 − δ, µ1 + δ) in this case as well. By
definition of δ and as f1(µ
′) = h′ ∈ R, we obtain |h′ − h| = |f1(µ′)− h| < ε, as required.
We proceed to the proof of Part b. By Part a, Equalizef1,f2 is continuous; it therefore
remains to show that Equalizef1,f2 is defined on a suffix of R+. Recall that for every µ ∈ R,
by definition Equalizef1,f2(µ) ∈ R iff there exists µ1 ∈ [0, µ] s.t. f1(µ1) = f2(µ − µ1) ∈ R. Let
µ ∈ R+ s.t. Equalizef1,f2(µ) ∈ R; therefore, there exists µ1 ∈ [0, µ] s.t. f1(µ1) = f2(µ−µ1) ∈ R.
Let µ′ > µ; note that as µ1 ≤ µ, we have µ1 + µ′ − µ ≤ µ′. Since f1(µ1), f2(µ− µ1) ∈ R and as
µ′ > µ, we have, by f1 and f2 being defined on a suffix of R+, that f1(µ1+µ′−µ), f2(µ′−µ1) ∈ R
as well. Furthermore, as f1 and f2 are nondecreasing, we have f1(µ1) = f2(µ−µ1) ≤ f2(µ′−µ1)
and f1(µ1 + µ
′ − µ) ≥ f1(µ1) = f2(µ− µ1) = f2
(
µ′ − (µ1 + µ′ − µ)
)
. By continuity of f1 and f2
and as [µ1, µ1 + µ
′ − µ] ⊆ f−11 (R) and [µ′ − (µ1 + µ′ − µ), µ′ − µ1] = [µ− µ1, µ′ − µ1] ⊆ f−12 (R),
we have by the intermediate value theorem that there exists µ′1 ∈ [µ1, µ1 + µ′ − µ] ⊆ [0, µ′] s.t.
f1(µ
′
1) = f2(µ
′ − µ′1) ∈ R, as required.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. By Lemma 3(b), we have that Equalizef1,...,fm is a real function iff
Equalizef1,...,fm(0) ∈ R, which by definition holds iff f1(0) = f2(0) = · · · = fm(0).
Proof of Lemma 4. By definition, S /∈ MG(S) for every S ∈ 2[n]6=∅ (by taking µ ,
∑
R∈2S6=∅ µ
R).
Therefore, MG
({1}) = ∅; furthermore, by Lemma 2(a), EG({1}) = Equalizef1(µ{1}) =
f1(µ
{1}) ∈ R. Therefore, {1} ∈ DG. In particular, we have that DG 6= ∅, and so, by finiteness
of DG, we have that PG 6= ∅ and that hG ∈ R is well defined.
Proof of Lemma 5. Both parts of the lemma follow straight from definition.
A.1.2 Uniqueness and Strength
Proof of Lemma 6. We start by proving Part c. Let R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. there exists j ∈ P s s.t.
sj(R) > 0; it is enough to show that R ∈ 2P s6=∅. By definition of s, hsj ≤ hsk for every k ∈ R, and
as hsj = Maxi∈[n] h
s
i ≥ hsk, we have hsk = hsj and so k ∈ P s for every k ∈ R. Therefore, R ∈ 2P
s
6=∅
as required.
We proceed to the proof of Part d. We first show that s′ is a consumption profile in the game
G′ , G− P s. Let R′ ∈ 2[n]\P s6=∅ . By definition of s′, we have that s′j(R′) =
∑
R∈R(R′,G′) sj(R) ≥
0 for every j ∈ [n] \ P s; furthermore, for every j ∈ ([n] \ P s) \ R′, we have by definition
that j /∈ R for every R ∈ R(R′, G′), and so s′j(R′) =
∑
R∈R(R′,G′) sj(R) = 0. Finally, we
have that
∑
j∈[n]\P s s
′
j(R
′) =
∑
j∈[n]\P s
∑
R∈R(R′,G′) sj(R) =
∑
R∈R(R′,G′)
∑
j∈[n]\P s sj(R) =∑
R∈R(R′,G′)
∑
j∈[n] sj(R) =
∑
R∈R(R′,G′) µ
R, where the penultimate equality is by Part c.
We move on to show that hsj = h
s′
j for every j ∈ [n] \ P s. By definition of s′, we
have for every j ∈ [n] \ P s that µs′j =
∑
R′∈2[n]\Ps6=∅
s′j(R
′) =
∑
R′∈2[n]\Ps6=∅
∑
R∈R(R′,G′) sj(R) =∑
R∈2[n]6=∅\2P
s
6=∅
sj(R) =
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅
sj(R) = µ
s
j (where the penultimate equality is since j /∈ R for
every R ∈ 2P s6=∅), and hence hs
′
j = fj(µ
s′
j ) = fj(µ
s
j) = h
s
j , as required.
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We conclude by showing that s′ is indeed a Nash equilibrium in G′. Let R′ ∈ 2[n]\P s6=∅ , and
let k ∈ supp(s′(R′)) and j ∈ R′. As 0 < s′k(R′) = ∑R∈R(R′,G′) sk(R), we have that there exists
R ∈ R(R′, G′) s.t. k ∈ supp(s(R)). As j ∈ R′ ⊆ R, since s′ is a Nash equilibrium in G, we have
that hsk ≤ hsj ; therefore, hs
′
k = h
s
k ≤ hsj = hs
′
j and so s
′ is a Nash equilibrium in G′, as required.
Before proceeding to prove Parts a and b, we prove a few auxiliary results. We first show
that
∀j ∈ P s : hsj = EG(P s) = Equalize
fk:k∈P s
(∑
R∈2Ps6=∅
µR
)
. (1)
By definition of P s, fj(µ
s
j) = h
s
j = h
s
k = fk(µ
s
k) for every j, k ∈ P s. Therefore, hsj =
Equalizefk:k∈P s
(∑
k∈P s µ
s
k
)
for every j ∈ P s. It is therefore enough to show that ∑k∈P s µsk =∑
R∈2Ps6=∅ µ
R. Indeed, we have
∑
k∈P s µ
s
k =
∑
k∈P s
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅
sk(R) =
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅
∑
k∈P s sk(R) =∑
R∈2Ps6=∅
∑
k∈P s sk(R) =
∑
R∈2Ps6=∅ µ
R, where the penultimate equality is by Part c, and the last
equality is because s(R) ∈ µR ·∆R ⊆ µR ·∆P s for every R ∈ 2P s6=∅.
Next, we show that for every S ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. EG(S) = Equalizefk:k∈S
(∑
R∈2S6=∅ µ
R
) ∈ R, there
exists k ∈ S s.t. fk(µsk) ≥ EG(S). Indeed, since s(R) ∈ µR ·∆R ⊆ µR ·∆S for every R ∈ 2S6=∅, we
have that
∑
R∈2S6=∅ µ
R =
∑
R∈2S6=∅
∑
k∈S sk(R) ≤
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅
∑
k∈S sk(R) =
∑
k∈S
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅
sk(R) =∑
k∈S µ
s
k and so, by Lemma 10(a), there exists k ∈ S s.t. fk(µsk) ≥ Equalizefk:k∈S
(∑
R∈2S6=∅ µ
R
)
=
EG(S), as required.
We now show that P s ∈ arg Max
S∈2[n]6=∅
EG(S), where the value undefined is treated as −∞
for comparisons by the Max operator. Let S ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. EG(S) ∈ R. As shown above, there
exists k ∈ S s.t. fk(µsk) ≥ EG(S). Therefore, by Eq. (1) and by definition of P s we obtain that
EG(P
s) = Maxj∈[n] hsj ≥ hsk = fk(µsk) ≥ EG(S), and so indeed P s ∈ arg MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S).
Finally, we show that MG(P
s) = ∅. We have to show that for every S ∈ 2P s6=∅ there exists
µ ≤∑
R∈2Ps6=∅\2
Ps\S
6=∅
µR s.t. Equalizefk:k∈S(µ) = EG(P
s). Let, therefore, S ∈ 2P s6=∅ and define µ ,∑
j∈S µ
s
j . By Eq. (1) and by definition of P
s, it is enough to show that both Equalizefk:k∈S(µ) =
Maxj∈[n] hsj and µ ≤
∑
R∈2Ps6=∅\2
Ps\S
6=∅
µR. Since S ⊆ P s, we have fk(µsk) = hsk = Max∈[n] hsj for
every k ∈ S, and so, by definition, Equalizefk:k∈S(µ) = Equalizefk:k∈S(
∑
j∈S µ
s
j) = Maxj∈[n] h
s
j .
For every j ∈ S, we have µsj =
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅
sj(R) =
∑
R∈2Ps6=∅ sj(R) =
∑
R∈2Ps6=∅\2
Ps\S
6=∅
sj(R), where the
penultimate equality is by Part c since j ∈ S ⊆ P s, and the last inequality is since j /∈ R for every
R ∈ 2P s\S6=∅ . Therefore,
∑
j∈S µ
s
j =
∑
j∈S
∑
R∈2Ps6=∅\2
Ps\S
6=∅
sj(R) =
∑
R∈2Ps6=∅\2
Ps\S
6=∅
∑
j∈S sj(R) ≤∑
R∈2Ps6=∅\2
Ps\S
6=∅
∑
j∈[n] sj(R) =
∑
R∈2Ps6=∅\2
Ps\S
6=∅
µR, as required, and so MG(P
s) = ∅.
We proceed to prove Part a by showing mutual containment between the two sides of the
equality.
⊆: It is enough to show that P s ∈ arg MaxS∈DG EG(S). As MG(P s) = ∅ and as by Eq. (1)
EG(P
s) ∈ R, we have P s ∈ DG. As EG(P s) = MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) ≥ MaxS∈DG EG(S), we
therefore have P s ∈ arg MaxS∈DG EG(S), as required.
⊇: We must show that S ⊆ P s for every S ∈ arg MaxS′′∈DG EG(S′′). Define S′ , S\P s ∈ 2S
and assume by way of contradiction that S′ 6= ∅. It is enough to show that Equalizefk:k∈S′(µ) 6=
EG(S) for every µ ≤
∑
R∈2S6=∅\2
S\S′
6=∅
µR, since this implies S′ ∈ MG(S) — a contradiction, as
S ∈ DG. Let, therefore, µ ≤
∑
R∈2S6=∅\2
S\S′
6=∅
µR; as by Lemma 4, EG(S) = hG ∈ R, it is enough
to show that if Equalizefk:k∈S′(µ) ∈ R, then Equalizefk:k∈S′(µ) < EG(S). Recall from the proof
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of the other direction (“⊆”) that P s ∈ arg MaxS′′∈DG EG(S′′); therefore, by definition of S, by
Eq. (1) and by definition of P s, we obtain that EG(S) = EG(P
s) = Maxk∈[n] hsk. It is thus
enough to show that Equalizefk:k∈S′(µ) < Maxk∈[n] h
s
k.
By definition of S′ and P s, we have that hsj < Maxk∈[n] h
s
k for every j ∈ S′ and hsj =
Maxk∈[n] hsk for every j ∈ S \S′; ergo, sj(R) = 0 for every j ∈ S \S′ and R ∈ 2S6=∅ \2
S\S′
6=∅ . Hence,∑
j∈S′ µ
s
j =
∑
j∈S′
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅
sj(R) ≥
∑
j∈S′
∑
R∈2S6=∅\2
S\S′
6=∅
sj(R) =
∑
R∈2S6=∅\2
S\S′
6=∅
∑
j∈S′ sj(R) =∑
R∈2S6=∅\2
S\S′
6=∅
∑
j∈S sj(R) =
∑
R∈2S6=∅\2
S\S′
6=∅
µR ≥ µ. Therefore, by Lemma 10(a) there exists j ∈
S′ s.t. fj(µsj) ≥ Equalizefk:k∈S′(µ), and thus Equalizefk:k∈S′(µ) ≤ fj(µsj) = hsj < Maxk∈[n] hsk,
as required.
We conclude by proving Part b. Recall from the proof of the first direction (⊆) of Part a
that EG(P
s) = MaxS∈DG EG(S). Therefore, by Eq. (1), h
s
j = EG(P
s) = MaxS∈DG EG(S) = hG
for every j ∈ P s, as required.
A.1.3 Constrained Distribution
Before proving Lemma 7, we first formulate and prove a combinatorial result that we use in the
proof of this lemma.
Definition 12 (Distribution Constraint).
• A distribution constraint is a pair
(
(µR)
R∈2[n]6=∅
,
(
[tj , Tj ]
)n
j=1
)
, where n ∈ N, µR ∈ R+ for
every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅, and tj ≤ Tj ∈ R+ for every j ∈ [n].
• We say that a distribution constraint C =
(
(µR)
R∈2[n]6=∅
,
(
[tj , Tj ]
)n
j=1
)
is satisfiable if there
exist (µRj )
R∈2[n]6=∅
j∈[n] s.t. (µ
R
j )j∈[n] ∈ µR ·∆R for every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ and
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅
µRj ∈ [tj , Tj ] for
every j ∈ [n].
• Given a distribution constraint C =
(
(µR)
R∈2[n]6=∅
,
(
[tj , Tj ]
)n
j=1
)
, for every S ∈ 2[n]6=∅ we
define mC(S) ,
∑
R∈2S6=∅ µ
R, MC(S) ,
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅\2
[n]\S
6=∅
µR, tC(S) ,
∑
j∈S tj and TC(S) ,∑
j∈S Tj . We say that C is normal if both tC(S) ≤MC(S) and mC(S) ≤ TC(S) for every
S ∈ 2[n]6=∅.
We note that it is trivial to show that every satisfiable distribution constraint is normal.
In this section, we constructively show (without the use of, e.g., linear programming) that the
other direction holds as well, and give a procedure for explicitly finding a solution to (i.e., a
witness to the satisfiability of) any given normal distribution.
Lemma 11. Every normal distribution constraint is satisfiable.
Before proving Lemma 11, we first develop some machinery.
Lemma 12. Let C =
(
(µR)
R∈2[n]6=∅
,
(
[tj , Tj ]
)n
j=1
)
be a normal distribution constraint.
a. MC(S∪S′) = tC(S∪S′), for every S, S′ ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. MC(S) = tC(S) and MC(S′) = tC(S′).
b. mC(S ∩ S′) = TC(S ∩ S′), for every S, S′ ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. mC(S) = TC(S), mC(S′) = TC(S′)
and S ∩ S′ 6= ∅.
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Proof. For every S, S′ ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. MC(S) = tC(S) and MC(S′) = tC(S′), we have MC(S ∪ S′) ≤
MC(S) +MC(S
′)−MC(S ∩S′) = tC(S) + tC(S′)−MC(S ∩S′) ≤ tC(S) + tC(S′)− tC(S ∩S′) =
tC(S ∪ S′), as required. (The other side of the inequality follows from normality of C.)
For every S, S′ ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. mC(S) = TC(S), mC(S′) = TC(S′) and S ∩ S′ 6= ∅, we have
mC(S ∩ S′) ≥ mC(S) + mC(S′) − mC(S ∪ S′) = TC(S) + TC(S′) − mC(S ∪ S′) ≥ TC(S) +
TC(S
′) − TC(S ∪ S′) = TC(S ∩ S′), as required. (Once again, the other side of the inequality
follows from normality of C.)
Lemma 13 (Moving Mass from R to {n}). Let C =
(
(µR)
R∈2[n]6=∅
,
(
[tj , Tj ]
)n
j=1
)
be a normal
distribution constraint. For every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. {n} ( R, we define
QRC , min
{
min
S∈2[n−1]6=∅ :
S∩R 6=∅
(
MC(S)− tC(S)
)
, min
S∈2[n]6=∅:
R 6⊆S & n∈S
(
TC(S)−mC(S)
)}
.
a. QRC ≥ 0 for every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. {n} ( R.
b. If tn > µ
{n}, then there exists R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. {n} ( R, µR > 0 and QRC > 0.
Let R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. {n} ( R and let µ ∈ [0, µR]. For every R′ ∈ 2
[n]
6=∅ \
{
R, {n}}, let µ′R′ , µR′ and
let µ′R , µR − µ ≥ 0 and µ′{n} , µ{n} + µ. Define C ′ , ((µ′R)
R∈2[n]6=∅
,
(
[tj , Tj ]
)
j∈[n]
)
.
c. If µ ≤ QRC , then C ′ is normal. Furthermore, in this case QRC′ = QRC − µ, and QR
′
C′ ≤ QR
′
C
for every R′ ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. {n} ( R′.
d. If C ′ is satisfiable, then C is satisfiable.
Remark 8. The condition of Lemma 13(c) is actually also necessary; i.e., C ′ is normal iff
µ ≤ QRC .
Proof of Lemma 13. Part a follows directly from the fact that C is normal, and so MC(S) −
tC(S) ≥ 0 and TC(S)−mC(S) ≥ 0 for every S ∈ 2[n]6=∅.
To prove Part b, let S1 ,
⋃{
S ∈ 2[n−1]6=∅
∣∣ MC(S) = tC(S)} ⊆ 2[n−1]6=∅ and S2 , [n] ∩⋂{S ∈
2
[n]
6=∅
∣∣ n ∈ S & TC(S) = mC(S)} ⊇ {n} (the intersection with [n] has an effect only if [n] is the
sole element in the intersection defining S2). We first show that there exists R ⊆ S2 \ S1 s.t.
{n} ( R and µR > 0.
For ease of notation, we extend the definition of mC(S), MC(S), tC(S), and TC(S) also to
the case S = ∅, via the same definition; we note that these all equal zero when S = ∅, as they
are all defined by empty sums in this case. We note that if S1 6= ∅, then MC(S1) = tC(S1) by
Lemma 12(a), and if S1 = ∅, then MC(S1) = 0 = tC(S1) by definition.
We first consider the case where S2 6= [n]. In this case, by Lemma 12(b), TC(S2) = mC(S2).
Let S , S1∩S2 ⊆ [n−1]. We note that tC(S1)− tC(S) = tC(S1 \S) ≤MC(S1 \S) = MC(S1)−∑
R∈2[n]6=∅\2
[n]\S
6=∅ :R∩(S1\S)=∅
µR ≤ MC(S1)−
∑
R∈2S26=∅\2
S2\S
6=∅
µR = tC(S1)−
∑
R∈2S26=∅\2
S2\S
6=∅
µR; there-
fore,
∑
R∈2S26=∅\2
S2\S
6=∅
µR ≤ tC(S) ≤ TC(S). Hence, and as Tn ≥ tn > µ{n}, we have that
mC(S2)−
∑
R∈2S26=∅\2
S2\S
6=∅
µR − µ{n} −∑
R∈2S2\S6=∅ :{n}(R
µR = mC
(
S2 \ (S ∪ {n})
) ≤ TC(S2 \ (S ∪
{n})) = TC(S2)−TC(S)−TC({n}) = mC(S2)−TC(S)−Tn < mC(S2)−∑R∈2S26=∅\2S2\S6=∅ µR−µ{n}.
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Therefore,
∑
R∈2S2\S6=∅ :{n}(R
µR > 0, and so there exists R ⊆ S2 \ S = S2 \ S1 s.t. {n} ( R and
µR > 0, as required.
We now consider the case in which S2 = [n]. Note that MC
(
S1 ∪ {n}
) ≥ tC(S1 ∪ {n}) =
tC(S1) + tn = MC(S1) + tn > MC(S1) +µ
{n} = MC
(
S1 ∪{n}
)−∑
R∈2[n]\S16=∅ :{n}(R
µR; therefore,∑
R∈2[n]\S16=∅ :{n}(R
µR > 0, and so there exists R ⊆ [n] \S1 = S2 \S1 s.t. {n} ( R and µR > 0, as
required.
Either way, there exists R ⊆ S2\S1 s.t. {n} ( R and µR > 0. Therefore, for every S ∈ 2[n−1]6=∅
s.t. S ∩R 6= ∅, we have S 6⊆ S1 and so MC(S) 6= tC(S) and by normality of C, MC(S) > tC(S);
for every S ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. n ∈ S and R 6⊆ S, we have S2 6⊆ S and so TC(S) 6= mC(S) and by
normality of C, TC(S) > mC(S). By both of these, Q
R
C > 0 and the proof of Part b is complete.
We move on to Part c; let S ∈ 2[n]6=∅. If R ⊆ S (and so also n ∈ S) or both R 6⊆ S and n /∈ S,
then by normality of C,
TC′(S) = TC(S) ≥ mC(S) =
∑
R∈2S6=∅
µR =
∑
R∈2S6=∅
µ′R = mC′(S);
otherwise, R 6⊆ S and n ∈ S, and by definition of µ and of QRC ,
TC′(S) = TC(S) ≥ mC(S) +QRC ≥ mC(S) + µ =
∑
R∈2S6=∅
µ′R = mC′(S).
If S ∩R = ∅ (and so also n /∈ S) or both S ∩R 6= ∅ and n ∈ S, then by normality of C,
tC′(S) = tC(S) ≤MC(S) =
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅\2
[n]\S
6=∅
µR =
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅\2
[n]\S
6=∅
µ′R = MC′(S);
otherwise, S ∩R 6= ∅ and n /∈ S, and by definition of µ and of QRC ,
tC′(S) = tC(S) ≤MC(S)−QRC ≤MC(S)− µ =
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅\2
[n]\S
6=∅
µ′R = MC′(S).
Therefore, C ′ is normal.
For every S ∈ 2[n−1]6=∅ s.t. S ∩ R 6= ∅, we have that MC′(S) = MC(S)− µ; for every S ∈ 2
[n]
6=∅
s.t. R 6⊆ S and n ∈ S, we have that mC′(S) = mC(S) + µ. Therefore,
QRC′ = min
{
min
S∈2[n−1]6=∅ :
S∩R 6=∅
(
MC′(S)− tC′(S)
)
, min
S∈2[n]6=∅:
R 6⊆S & n∈S
(
TC′(S)−mC′(S)
)}
=
= min
{
min
S∈2[n−1]6=∅ :
S∩R 6=∅
(
MC(S)− µ− tC(S)
)
, min
S∈2[n]6=∅:
R 6⊆S & n∈S
(
TC(S)−mC(S)− µ
)}
=
=QRC − µ.
For every S ∈ 2[n−1]6=∅ , we have MC′(S) ∈
{
MC(S),MC(S)− µ
}
(as shown above, depending
on whether or not both S ∩ R 6= ∅ and n /∈ S); for every S ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. n ∈ S, we have that
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mC′(S) ∈
{
mC(S),mC(S)+µ
}
(as shown above, depending on whether or not both R 6⊆ S and
n ∈ S). Therefore, for every R′ ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. {n} ( R′,
QR
′
C′ = min
{
min
S∈2[n−1]6=∅ :
S∩R′ 6=∅
(
MC′(S)− tC′(S)
)
, min
S∈2[n]6=∅:
R′ 6⊆S & n∈S
(
TC′(S)−mC′(S)
)} ≤
≤ min
{
min
S∈2[n−1]6=∅ :
S∩R′ 6=∅
(
MC(S)− tC(S)
)
, min
S∈2[n]6=∅:
R′ 6⊆S & n∈S
(
TC(S)−mC(S)
)}
=
=QR
′
C .
Therefore, the proof of Part c is complete.
We conclude by proving Part d. As C ′ is satisfiable, by definition there exist (µ′R′j )
R′∈2[n]6=∅
j∈[n]
s.t. (µ′R′j )j∈[n] ∈ µ′R
′ ·∆R′ for every R′ ∈ 2[n]6=∅ and
∑
R′∈2[n]6=∅
µ′R′j ∈ [tj , Tj ] for every j ∈ [n]. For
every (j, R′) ∈ [n] × 2[n]6=∅, if j 6= n or R′ /∈
{
R, {n}}, let µR′j , µ′R′j ; let µRn , µ′Rn + µ and
µ
{n}
n , µ′{n}n − µ. (As µ′{n}n = µ′{n} = µ{n} + µ, we have that µ{n}n ∈ R+.)
For every R′ ∈ 2[n]6=∅ \
{
R, {n}}, by definition (µR′j )j∈[n] = (µ′R′j )j∈[n] ∈ µ′R′ ·∆R′ = µR′ ·∆R′ .
Furthermore, as (µ′Rj )j∈[n] ∈ µ′R · ∆R and by definition of (µRj )j∈[n] and as n ∈ R, we have
that (µRj )j∈[n] ∈ (µ′R + µ) · ∆R = µR · ∆R. Similarly, as (µ′{n}j )j∈[n] ∈ µ′{n} · ∆{n} and by
definition of (µ
{n}
j )j∈[n], we have that (µ
{n}
j )j∈[n] ∈ (µ′{n} − µ) · ∆{n} = µ{n} · ∆{n}. Finally,∑
R′∈2[n]6=∅
µR
′
j =
∑
R′∈2[n]6=∅
µ′R′j ∈ [tj , Tj ] for every j ∈ [n], and the proof is complete.
Lemma 14 (Distributing All Mass but µ{n} among [n− 1]). Let C =
(
(µR)
R∈2[n]6=∅
,
(
[tj , Tj ]
)n
j=1
)
be a normal distribution constraint s.t. µ{n} ≥ tn. We say that condition DC holds if TC(S) ≥
mC
(
S ∪ {n})− µ{n} for every S ∈ 2[n−1]6=∅ .
a. If Tn = µ{n}, then condition DC holds.
b. If QRC = 0 for every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. {n} ( R and µR > 0, then condition DC holds.
For every R ∈ 2[n−1]6=∅ , let µ′R , µR + µR∪{n}. Define C ′ ,
(
(µ′R)
R∈2[n−1]6=∅
,
(
[tj , Tj ]
)
j∈[n−1]
)
.
c. If condition DC holds, then C
′ is normal.
d. If C ′ is satisfiable, the C is satisfiable.
Remark 9. Once again, the condition of Lemma 14(c) is actually also necessary; i.e., C ′ is
normal iff condition DC holds.
Proof of Lemma 14. Part a holds as for every S ∈ 2[n−1]6=∅ , TC(S) = TC
(
S ∪ {n}) − Tn ≥
mC
(
S ∪ {n})− Tn = mC(S ∪ {n})− µ{n}.
To prove Part b, define S1 and S2 as in the proof of Lemma 13(b); as in that proof, it suffices
to show that if condition DC does not hold, then there exists R ⊆ S2 \ S1 s.t. {n} ( R and
µR > 0. As in that proof, we extend the definition of mC(S), MC(S), tC(S) and TC(S) also to
the case S = ∅. By Part a, Tn > µ{n}. If S2 6= [n], then the proof follows as in the proof of
Lemma 13(b) (as that proof only uses the fact that µ{n} < Tn when S2 6= [n], and does not rely
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on the inequality µ{n} < tn for this case). It therefore remains to consider the case in which
S2 = [n].
Recall that if S1 6= ∅, then MC(S1) = tC(S1) by Lemma 12(a), and if S1 = ∅, then MC(S1) =
0 = tC(S1) by definition. As condition DC does not hold, there exists S ∈ 2[n−1]6=∅ s.t. TC(S) <
mC
(
S ∪ {n})− µ{n}.
Let S′ , S1 ∩ S ⊆ [n − 1]. We note that tC(S1) − tC(S′) = tC(S1 \ S′) ≤ MC(S1 \
S′) = MC(S1) −
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅\2
[n]\S′
6=∅ :R∩(S1\S′)=∅
µR ≤ MC(S1) −
∑
R∈2S∪{n}6=∅ \2
S∪{n}\S′
6=∅
µR = tC(S1) −∑
R∈2S∪{n}6=∅ \2
S∪{n}\S′
6=∅
µR; therefore,
∑
R∈2S∪{n}6=∅ \2
S∪{n}\S′
6=∅
µR ≤ tC(S′) ≤ TC(S′). Hence, by defini-
tion of S we have that mC
(
S∪{n})−∑
R∈2S∪{n}6=∅ \2
(S∪{n})\S′
6=∅
µR−µ{n}−∑
R∈2(S∪{n})\S′6=∅ :{n}(R
µR =
mC(S \ S′) ≤ TC(S \ S′) = TC(S)− TC(S′) < mC
(
S ∪ {n})− TC(S′)− µ{n} ≤ mC(S ∪ {n})−∑
R∈2S∪{n}6=∅ \2
(S∪{n})\S′
6=∅
µR − µ{n}. Therefore, ∑
R∈2(S∪{n})\S′6=∅ :{n}(R
µR > 0, and so there exists
R ⊆ (S ∪ {n}) \ S′ ⊆ S2 \ S1 s.t. {n} ( R and µR > 0, as required, and the proof of Part b is
complete.
We move on to Part c. For every S ∈ 2[n−1]6=∅ , as condition DC holds,
TC′(S) = TC(S) ≥ mC
(
S ∪ {n})− µ{n} = ∑
R∈2S6=∅
(µR + µR∪{n}) = mC′(S);
furthermore,
tC′(S) = tC(S) ≤MC(S) =
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅\2
[n]\S
6=∅
µR =
∑
R∈2[n−1]6=∅ \2
[n−1]\S
6=∅
(µR + µR∪{n}) = MC′(S).
Therefore, C ′ is normal, as required.
We conclude by proving Part d. As C ′ is satisfiable, by definition there exist (µ′Rj )
R′∈2[n−1]6=∅
j∈[n−1]
s.t. (µ′Rj )j∈[n−1] ∈ µ′R ·∆R for every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ and
∑
R∈2[n−1]6=∅
µ′Rj ∈ [tj , Tj ] for every j ∈ [n− 1].
For every R ∈ 2[n−1]6=∅ , if µ′R = 0, then we define µRj , 0 and µ
R∪{n}
j , 0 for every j ∈ [n − 1];
otherwise, we define µRj , µ
R
µ′R · µ′Rj and µ
R∪{n}
j ,
µR∪{n}
µ′R · µ′Rj for every j ∈ [n− 1]. We further
define µRn , 0 for every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ \ {n}, µ
{n}
n , µ{n} and µ{n}j , 0 for every j ∈ [n− 1].
For every R ∈ 2[n−1]6=∅ , if µ′R = 0 then by definition (µRj )j∈[n] ≡ 0 ∈ 0 · ∆R = µR · ∆R and
similarly (µ
R∪{n}
j )j∈[n] ≡ 0 ∈ 0 · ∆R = µR∪{n} · ∆R∪{n}; otherwise. as (µ′Rj )j∈[n−1] ∈ µ′R · ∆R
and by definition of (µRj )j∈[n] and (µ
R∪{n}
j )j∈[n], we have that (µ
R
j )j∈[n] ∈ µ
R
µ′Rµ
′R ·∆R = µR ·∆R
and similarly (µ
R∪{n}
j )j∈[n] ∈ µ
R∪{n}
µ′R µ
′R ·∆R = µR∪{n} ·∆R ⊆ µR∪{n} ·∆R∪{n}. Furthermore,
by definition (µ
{n}
j )j∈[n] ∈ µ{n} ·∆{n}. Finally,
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅
µRj =
∑
R∈2[n−1]6=∅
µ′Rj ∈ [tj , Tj ] for every
j ∈ [n− 1], and ∑
R∈2[n]6=∅
µRn = µ
{n}
n = µ{n} ∈ [tn, Tn] (where µ{n} = mC
({n}) ≤ TC({n}) = Tn
by normality of C) and the proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma 11. Let C =
(
(µR)
R∈2[n]6=∅
,
(
[tj , Tj ]
)n
j=1
)
be a normal distribution constraint.
We prove the claim by induction on n ∈ N.
(Outer induction) Base: For n = 1, we have by definition that mC
({1}) = µ{1} = MC({1}),
and so t1 = tC
({1}) ≤ MC({1}) = µ{1} = mC({1}) ≤ TC({1}) = T1. Therefore, setting
µ
{1}
1 , µ{1} completes the proof of the (outer) induction base.
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(Outer induction) Step: Let n > 1 and assume that the lemma holds for n − 1. We prove
the induction step by full induction on
∣∣∣{R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ ∣∣ {n} ( 2[n]6=∅ & µR > 0 & QRC > 0}∣∣∣.
(Inner induction) Base: If
∣∣∣{R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ ∣∣ {n} ( 2[n]6=∅ & µR > 0 & QRC > 0}∣∣∣ = 0,
then by Lemma 13(b), tn ≤ µ{n}, and by Lemma 14(b), condition DC holds. Therefore, by
Lemma 14(c), C ′ as defined in Lemma 14 is normal, and by the (outer) induction hypothesis
for n− 1, C ′ is satisfiable. By Lemma 14(d), C is satisfiable as well.
(Inner induction) Step: Assume that
∣∣∣{R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ ∣∣ {n} ( R & µR > 0 & QRC > 0}∣∣∣ > 0
and that the claim holds whenever this set is of smaller cardinality. Therefore, there exists
R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. {n} ( R, µR > 0 and QRC > 0; let µ , min{QRC , µR} > 0, and define C ′ w.r.t. R
and µ as in Lemma 13. By Lemma 13(c), C ′ is normal. If µ = µR, then µ′R = 0; otherwise,
µ = QRC and by Lemma 13(c), Q
R
C′ = Q
R
C −µ = 0. Either way, and by definition of C ′ and as by
Lemma 13(c) QR
′
C′ = 0 whenever Q
R′
C = 0, we have that
∣∣∣{R′ ∈ 2[n]6=∅ ∣∣ {n} ( R′ & µ′R′ > 0 &
QR
′
C′ > 0
}∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣{R′ ∈ 2[n]6=∅ ∣∣ {n} ( R′ & µR′ > 0 & QR′C > 0} \ {R}∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣{R′ ∈ 2[n]6=∅ ∣∣ {n} (
R′ & µR′ > 0 & QR′C > 0
}∣∣∣− 1 and so, by the (inner) induction hypothesis, C ′ is satisfiable.
By Lemma 13(d), C is satisfiable as well and the proof is complete.
A.1.4 Existence
Lemma 15 (hG = MaxS∈2[n]6=∅
EG(S)). Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a resource selection
game.
a. Max
S∈2[n]6=∅
EG(S) ∈ R is well defined.
b. If f1, . . . , fn are continuous, then hG = MaxS∈2[n]6=∅
EG(S).
In both parts, the value undefined is treated as −∞ for comparisons by the Max operator.
Proof. To show Part a, note that by Lemma 2(a), EG
({1}) = Equalizef1(µ{1}) = f1(µ{1}) ∈ R;
therefore, EG({1}) ∈ R, and so MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S) ∈ R, as required.
Define A , arg Max
S∈2[n]6=∅
EG(S). Before proving Part b, we first show that for every S ∈ A
and M ′ ∈ MG(S), if (fj)j∈S\M ′ are continuous, then also S \M ′ ∈ A. Let, therefore, S ∈ A
and let M ′ ∈ MG(S) s.t. (fj)j∈S\M ′ are continuous. By definition of M ′, we have both that
M ′ ( S (see Lemma 4) and that Equalizefk:k∈M ′(µ) 6= EG(S) for every µ ≤
∑
R∈2S6=∅\2
S\M′
6=∅
µR.
By Part a, EG(S) ∈ R, and so by definition there exist (µj)j∈S ∈ RS+ s.t.
∑
j∈S µj =
∑
R∈2S6=∅ µ
R
and fj(µj) = EG(S) for every j ∈ S. Therefore, Equalizefk:k∈S\M ′
(∑
j∈S\M ′ µj
)
= EG(S), and
also Equalizefk:k∈M ′(µ) = EG(S), where µ ,
∑
j∈M ′ µj .
As M ′ ∈ MG(S), we thus have that µ >
∑
R∈2S6=∅\2
S\M′
6=∅
µR. Therefore,
∑
R∈2S\M′6=∅
µR =∑
R∈2S6=∅ µ
R −∑
R∈2S6=∅\2
S\M′
6=∅
µR >
∑
R∈2S6=∅ µ
R − µ = ∑j∈S µj − µ = ∑j∈S µj −∑j∈M ′ µj =∑
j∈S\M ′ µj . Recall that Equalizefk:k∈S\M ′
(∑
j∈S\M ′ µj
)
= EG(S) ∈ R; therefore, by continuity
of (fk)k∈S\M ′ and by Lemma 3(b), we obtain that also Equalizefk:k∈S\M ′
(∑
R∈2S\M′6=∅
µR
) ∈
R. Hence, by Lemma 1 we conclude that EG(S \M ′) = Equalizefk:k∈S\M ′
(∑
R∈2S\M′6=∅
µR
) ≥
Equalizefk:k∈S\M ′
(∑
j∈S\M ′ µj
)
= EG(S), and so indeed S \M ′ ∈ A, as required.
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We conclude by proving Part b. By definition hG ≤ MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S); we therefore have to
show that hG ≥ MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S). Let S ∈ A. We sequentially define a series (Si)
k
i=0, for k ∈ N
to be determined, as follows:
• S0 , S.
• If MG(Si) = ∅, then we set k , i and conclude. Otherwise, choose Mi ∈MG(Si) arbitrar-
ily, and set Si+1 , Si \Mi.
We now show by induction that Si ∈ A and |Si| ≤ |S| − i for every i for which Si is defined.
• Base: By definition, S0 = S ∈ A and |S0| ≤ |S0| − 0 = |S| − 0, as required.
• Step: Let i > 0 for which Si is defined. By the induction hypothesis, Si−1 ∈ A; therefore,
as shown above and by continuity of (fj)j∈Si−1\Mi−1 , we have that Si = Si−1 \Mi−1 ∈ A.
Furthermore, as by definition Mi−1 6= ∅, we have by the induction hypothesis that |Si| =
|Si−1| − |Mi−1| ≤ |Si−1| − 1 ≤ |S| − (i− 1)− 1 = |S| − i, as required.
We conclude that the process constructing (Si)i indeed stops (i.e., k is well defined), and
with k < |S|. By definition, MG(Sk) = ∅, and as Sk ∈ A, by Part a we have EG(Sk) =
Max
S′∈2[n]6=∅
EG(S
′) ∈ R; therefore, Sk ∈ DG. Therefore, hG ≥ EG(Sk) = MaxS′∈2[n]6=∅ EG(S
′), as
required.
We note that it can be shown that, in the context of Lemma 15(b), for every S ∈ A s.t.
MG(S) 6= ∅, in fact
⋃
MG(S) ∈ MG(S) and MG
(
S \⋃MG(S)) = ∅. While this may be used
to avoid the inductive construction concluding the proof of this lemma, the need to prove these
facts would result in a considerably longer total length for the proof.
Lemma 16. Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a resource selection game s.t. f1, . . . , fn are
continuous. For every S ∈ arg MaxS′∈DG EG(S′), there exists a strategy profile s in the |S|-
resource selection game G′ ,
(
(fj)j∈S ; (µR)R∈2S6=∅
)
, s.t. hsj = hG for every j ∈ S.
Proof. For every j ∈ S, let tj , min f−1j (hG) and Tj , Max f−1j (hG) if sup f−1j (hG) 6= ∞ and
Tj ,
∑
R∈2[n]6=∅
µR otherwise (tj and Tj are well defined by continuity of fj and since EG(S) =
hG); regardless of how we define Tj , we have that both fj(Tj) = hG and Tj ≥ tj (when
sup f−1j (hG) =∞, this is since EG(S) = hG and since fj is nondecreasing).
We now show that C ,
(
(µR)R∈2S6=∅ ,
(
[tj , Tj ]
)
j∈S
)
is a normal distribution constraint. (See
Appendix A.1.3; we slightly abuse notation by treating S in the context of C as
[|S|], using
an arbitrary isomorphism.) Let S′ ∈ 2S6=∅. As M(S) = ∅, there exists µ ≤
∑
R∈2S6=∅\2
S\S′
6=∅
µR
s.t. Equalizefk:k∈S′(µ) = EG(S) = hG; therefore, tC(S
′) =
∑
j∈S′ tj ≤ µ ≤
∑
R∈2S6=∅\2
S\S′
6=∅
µR =
MC(S
′). Assume by way of contradiction that
∑
R∈2S′6=∅
µR >
∑
j∈S′ Tj . As fj(Tj) = hG for
every j ∈ S′, we have Equalizefk:k∈S′
(∑
j∈S′ Tj
)
= hG ∈ R. By continuity of (fj)j∈S′ and by
Lemma 3(b), we thus have that EG(S
′) ∈ R; therefore, there exist (µj)j∈S′ s.t.
∑
j∈S′ µj =∑
R∈2S′6=∅
µR and fj(µj) = EG(S
′) for every j ∈ S′. As ∑j∈S′ µj = ∑R∈2S′6=∅ µR > ∑j∈S′ Tj ,
there exists j ∈ S′ s.t. µj > Tj ; As Tj < µj ≤
∑
R∈2S′6=∅
µR ≤ ∑
R∈2[n]6=∅
µR, we have that
Tj = Max f
−1
j (hG), and so EG(S
′) = fj(µj) > hG = MaxS′′∈2[n]6=∅
EG(S
′′) (where the last equality
is by Lemma 15(b)) — a contradiction. Therefore, mC(S
′) =
∑
R∈2S′6=∅
µR ≤∑j∈S′ Tj = TC(S′).
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As C is normal, by Lemma 11 it is satisfiable, and so there exist
(
sj(R)
)R∈2S6=∅
j∈S s.t. s(R) ∈
µR · ∆R for every R ∈ 2S6=∅ and
∑
R∈2S6=∅ sj(R) ∈ [tj , Tj ] for every j ∈ S. By the former, s is
a strategy profile in G′, and by the latter, for every j ∈ S we have that µsj ∈ [tj , Tj ], and so
by definition of tj and Tj and since fj is nondecreasing, h
s
j = fj(µ
s
j) = hG and the proof is
complete.
Lemma 17 (EG(PG) = hG). Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a resource selection game. If
f1, . . . , fn are continuous, then PG ∈ arg MaxS∈DG EG(S).
Proof. Define A , arg MaxS∈DG EG(S). By Lemma 4, A 6= ∅. Therefore, by definition of PG,
it is enough to show that S′ ∪ S′′ ∈ A for every S′, S′′ ∈ A. Let, therefore, S′, S′′ ∈ A; it is
enough to show that S′ ∪ S′′ ∈ DG and that EG(S′ ∪ S′′) = hG.
By Lemma 16, there exists a strategy profile s′ in the game
(
(fj)j∈S′ ; (µR)R∈2S′6=∅
)
s.t. hs
′
j =
hG for every j ∈ S′; similarly, there exists a strategy profile s′′ in the game
(
(fj)j∈S′′ ; (µR)R∈2S′′6=∅
)
s.t. hs
′′
j = hG for every j ∈ S′′. For every R ∈ 2S
′
6=∅, we define s(R) , s′(R) and set µ˜R , µR;
for every R ∈ 2S′′6=∅ \ 2S
′
6=∅, we define sj(R) , s′′j (R) for every j ∈ S′′ \ S′ and sj(R) , 0 for every
j ∈ S′ ∩ S′′ and set µ˜R , µR −∑j∈S′∩S′′ sj(R); finally, for every R ∈ 2S′∪S′′6=∅ \ (2S′6=∅ ∪ 2S′′6=∅),
we define s(R) , 0 and set µ˜R , 0. By definition, s is a consumption profile in the game(
(fj)j∈S′∪S′′ ; (µ˜R)R∈2S′∪S′′6=∅
)
. Note that for every R ∈ 2S′∪S′′6=∅ , we have that µ˜R ≤ µR.
For every j ∈ S′, by definition of s we have µsj = µs
′
j and so fj(µ
s
j) = fj(µ
s′
j ) = h
s′
j = hG.
For every j ∈ S′′ \ S′, by definition we have µsj = µs
′′
j and so fj(µ
s
j) = fj(µ
s′′
j ) = h
s′′
j =
hG. Therefore, hG = Equalizefk:k∈S′∪S′′
(∑
j∈S′∪S′′ µ
s
j
)
= Equalizefk:k∈S′∪S′′
(∑
R∈2S′∪S′′6=∅
µ˜R
)
.
As
∑
R∈2S′∪S′′6=∅
µ˜R ≤ ∑
R∈2S′∪S′′6=∅
µR, we have by continuity of (fk)k∈S′∪S′′ , by Lemma 4 and
by Lemma 3(b) that EG(S
′ ∪ S′′) ∈ R. Therefore, by Lemma 1, we obtain EG(S′ ∪ S′′) ≥
Equalizefk:k∈S′∪S′′
(∑
R∈2S′∪S′′6=∅
µ˜R
)
= hG. Thus, by Lemma 15(b), EG(S
′ ∪ S′′) = hG. It
therefore remains to show that S′ ∪ S′′ ∈ DG.
We have to show that for every S ∈ 2S′∪S′′6=∅ , there exists µ ≤
∑
R∈2S′∪S′′6=∅ \2
(S′∪S′′)\S
6=∅
µR s.t.
Equalizefk:k∈S(µ) = EG(S
′∪S′′); let therefore S ∈ 2S′∪S′′6=∅ . Define µ ,
∑
j∈S µ
s
j . As fj(µ
s
j) = hG
for every j ∈ S′ ∪ S′′, we have Equalizefk:k∈S(µ) = hG = EG(S′ ∪ S′′). By definition of s, we
have that µ =
∑
j∈S µ
s
j ≤
∑
R∈2S′∪S′′6=∅ \2
(S′∪S′′)\S
6=∅
µ˜R ≤ ∑
R∈2S′∪S′′6=∅ \2
(S′∪S′′)\S
6=∅
µR, and the proof is
complete.
Proof of Lemma 7. Part a follows directly from Lemmas 16 and 17. We therefore prove Part b.
Let G′ , G − PG and assume by way of contradiction that hG′ ≥ hG; recall that by definition
PG′ ⊆ [n] \ PG and so PG′ and PG are disjoint. As by Lemma 4, PG′ 6= ∅, we aim to obtain a
contradiction by showing that PG′ ⊆ PG.
By Lemma 17, PG ∈ arg MaxS∈DG EG(S); therefore, we have by definition that hG =
EG(PG) = Equalizefk:k∈PG
(∑
R∈2PG6=∅
µR
)
. By Lemma 4, hG ∈ R and so there exist (µj)j∈PG ∈
RPG+ s.t.
∑
j∈PG µj =
∑
R∈2PG6=∅
µR and fj(µj) = hG for every j ∈ PG.
Similarly, by Lemma 17, PG′ ∈ arg MaxS∈DG′ EG′(S); therefore, and by definition of G′, we
have that hG′ = EG′(PG′) = Equalizefk:k∈PG′
(∑
R∈2PG∪PG′6=∅ \2
PG
6=∅
µR
)
. By Lemma 4, hG′ ∈ R and
so there exist (µ′j)j∈PG′ ∈ R
PG′
+ s.t.
∑
j∈PG′ µ
′
j =
∑
R∈2PG∪PG′6=∅ \2
PG
6=∅
µR and fj(µ
′
j) = hG′ ≥ hG for
every j ∈ PG′ . Let j ∈ PG′ . As fj is nondecreasing, by Lemma 2(a) and by definition of hG,
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we have fj(0) ≤ fj(µ{j}) = EG({j}) ≤ hG. By continuity of fj and by the intermediate value
theorem, there thus exists µj ∈ [0, µ′j ] s.t. fj(µj) = hG.
As fj(µj) = hG for every j ∈ PG ∪ PG′ , by definition Equalizefk:k∈PG∪PG′
(∑
j∈PG∪PG′ µj
)
=
hG. As
∑
j∈PG∪PG′ µj =
∑
j∈PG µj +
∑
j∈PG′ µj ≤
∑
j∈PG µj +
∑
j∈PG′ µ
′
j =
∑
R∈2PG6=∅
µR +∑
R∈2PG∪PG′6=∅ \2
PG
6=∅
µR =
∑
R∈2PG∪PG′6=∅
µR, we have by Lemma 3(b) that EG(P ∪ PG′) ∈ R and
therefore, by Lemma 1, EG(PG ∪ PG′) ≥ hG. Therefore, by definition of PG, in order to show
that PG′ ⊆ PG and complete the proof, it is enough to show that MG(PG ∪ PG′) = ∅.
Let S ∈ 2PG∪PG′6=∅ . By Lemma 17, MG(PG) = ∅ and so, if S ∩ PG 6= ∅, then there exists
µ′′ ≤ ∑
R∈2PG6=∅ \2
PG\(S∩PG)
6=∅
µR s.t. Equalizefk:k∈S∩PG(µ
′′) = EG(PG) = hG. If S ∩ PG = ∅, then
set µ′′ , 0.
Similarly, by Lemma 17, MG′(PG′) = ∅ and so, if S ∩ PG′ 6= ∅, then there exists µ′ ≤∑
R∈2PG∪PG′6=∅ \2
PG∪PG′ \(S∩PG′ )
6=∅
µR s.t. Equalizefk:k∈S∩PG′ (µ
′) = EG′(PG′) = hG′ . As fj(µj) = hG
for every j ∈ PG′ , we also have in this case that Equalizefk:k∈S∩PG′
(∑
j∈S∩PG′ µj
)
= hG. By both
of these and by Lemma 1, Equalizefk:k∈S∩PG′
(
min{µ′,∑j∈S∩PG′ µj}) = min{hG′ , hG} = hG in
this case. If S ∩ PG′ = ∅, then set µ′ , 0.
Define µ , µ′′ + min{µ′,∑j∈S∩PG′ µj}. By definition of µ (and by Lemma 2(b) if neither
S∩PG = ∅ nor S∩PG′ = ∅), we have that Equalizefk:k∈S(µ) = hG; it is therefore enough to show
that µ ≤∑
R∈2PG∪PG′6=∅ \2
PG∪PG′ \S
6=∅
µR in order to complete the proof. Indeed, since PG and PG′ are
disjoint, we obtain that µ = µ′′ + min{µ′,∑j∈S∩PG′ µj} ≤ µ′′ + µ′ ≤ ∑R∈2PG6=∅ \2PG\(S∩PG)6=∅ µR +∑
R∈2PG∪PG′6=∅ \2
PG∪PG′ \(S∩PG′ )
6=∅
µR ≤∑
R∈2PG∪PG′6=∅ \2
PG∪PG′ \S
6=∅
µR, as required.
A.2 Proof of the Theorems and Corollary from Section 3.2
We defer the proof of Theorem 3.1 until after that of Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We prove the theorem by full induction on n.
Let n ∈ N and assume that the theorem holds for all smaller natural values of n. Let
G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be an n-resource selection game and let s, s′ be Nash equilibria in G.
By Lemma 6(a,b), hsj = hG = h
s′
j , for every j ∈ PG. If PG = [n], then the proof is complete. Oth-
erwise, let s′′, s′′′ : 2[n]\PG6=∅ → R
[n]\PG
+ be the functions defined by s
′′
j (R
′) ,
∑
R∈R(R′,G−PG) sj(R)
and s′′′j (R
′) ,
∑
R∈R(R′,G−PG) s
′
j(R) for every j ∈ [n] \ PG. By Lemma 6(a,d), s′′, s′′′ are both
Nash equilibria in G − PG, and so, by the induction hypothesis (since PG 6= ∅ by Lemma 4),
we obtain that hs
′′
j = h
s′′′
j for every j ∈ [n] \ PG. Therefore, by Lemma 6(a,d), we have
hsj = h
s′′
j = h
s′′′
j = h
s′
j for every j ∈ [n] \ PG as well, and so hsj = hs
′
j for every j ∈ [n], as
required.
Proof of Corollary 3.1. We start by proving Part a. Let s, s′ be Nash equilibria in G, and
let R ∈ 2[n]6=∅. By definition of Nash equilibrium and by Theorem 3.2, we have for every k ∈
supp
(
s(R)
)
and k′ ∈ supp(s′(R)) that hsk = minj∈R hsj = minj∈R hs′j = hs′k′ , as required.
We move on to prove Part b; Let j ∈ [n]. Let S = {k ∈ [n] ∣∣ hsk = hsj}; by Theorem 3.2,
S =
{
k ∈ [n] ∣∣ hs′k = hs′j } as well. Let R , {R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ ∣∣ supp(s(R)) ⊆ S}; by Theorem 3.2
and Part a, R = {R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ ∣∣ supp(s′(R)) ⊆ S} as well. Assume w.l.o.g. that hsj is not a
plateau height of any of S \ {j}; we therefore have to show that µsk = µs
′
k for every k ∈ S. For
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every k ∈ S \ {j}, as hsj is not a plateau height of fk, there exists a unique value µk ∈ R+
s.t. fk(µk) = h
s
j . Therefore, and as by definition of S and by Theorem 3.2 we have that
fk(µ
s
k) = h
s
k = h
s
j = h
s′
j = h
s′
k = fk(µ
s′
k ) for every k ∈ S \ {j}, we have that µsk = µk = µs
′
k
for every k ∈ S \ {j}. By Part a, we have that ∑k∈S µsk = ∑R∈R µR = ∑k∈S µs′k , and so
µsj =
∑
R∈R µ
R −∑k∈S\{j} µsk = ∑R∈R µR −∑k∈S\{j} µs′k = µs′j . Therefore, µsk = µs′k for every
k ∈ S and the proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We begin by proving Part a by full induction on n. Let n ∈ N and
assume that the claim holds for all smaller natural values of n. Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be an n-resource selection game and let s be Nash equilibrium in G. For every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ with
µR 6= 0, let hR , hsj for every j ∈ supp
(
s(R)
)
. Let s′ be a consumption profile s.t. hs′k < h
R for
every R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ and k ∈ supp
(
s′(R)
)
s.t. s′k(R) > sk(R). We must show that s
′ = s.
We begin by showing that s′(R) = s(R) for every R ∈ 2P s6=∅, for P s as defined in Lemma 6.
Assume by way of contradiction that s′(R) 6= s(R) for some R ∈ 2P s6=∅. Let S = {j ∈ P s | hs
′
j <
hG} ⊆ P s. As s′(R) 6= s(R), there exists k ∈ R s.t. s′k(R) > sk(R) and so k ∈ supp
(
s′(R)
)
.
Therefore, by definition of s′ and by Lemma 6(b), we have that hs′k < h
s
k = hG and so k ∈ S; in
particular, S 6= ∅.
For every j ∈ S, by definition of S and by Lemma 6(b), we have that fj(µs′j ) = hs
′
j < hG =
hsj = fj(µ
s
j); therefore, as fj is nondecreasing we have that µ
s′
j < µ
s
j for every such j. Therefore,
as S 6= ∅, ∑j∈S µs′j < ∑j∈S µsj . By definition of consumption profile and by Lemma 6(c),∑
j∈P s µ
s′
j ≥
∑
R′∈2Ps6=∅ µ
R′ =
∑
j∈P s µ
s
j . By both of these,
∑
j∈P s\S µ
s′
j >
∑
j∈P s\S µ
s
j , and so
there exists j ∈ P s \ S s.t. µs′j > µsj ; hence, there exists R′ ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. s′j(R′) > sj(R′) (and so
j ∈ supp(s′(R′))), however, by definition of S and as fj is nondecreasing, we have that
hs
′
j = fj(µ
s′
j ) ≥ fj(µsj) = hsj = hG ≥ hR
′
(2)
(as s′j(R
′) > 0, hR′ is well defined), even though s′j(R
′) > sj(R′) — a contradiction. Therefore,
s′(R) = s(R) for every R ∈ 2P s6=∅. By definition of s′, by definition of P s and by Lemma 6(c), we
thus obtain that s′j ≡ sj for every j ∈ P s.
If P s = [n], then the proof is complete. Otherwise, define s′′ : 2[n]\P
s
6=∅ → R
[n]\P s
+ by s
′′
j (R
′) ,∑
R∈R(R′,G−P s) sj(R) for every j ∈ [n]\P s. By Lemma 6(d), s′′ is a Nash equilibrium in G−P s,
and hs
′′
j = h
s
j for every j ∈ [n] \ P s. For every R′ ∈ 2[n]\P
s
6=∅ with µ
R′ 6= 0, let h′R′ , hs′′j for
every j ∈ supp(s′′(R)); by definition, h′R′ = hR for every R′ ∈ 2[n]\P s6=∅ and R ∈ R(R′, G − P s)
s.t. µR 6= 0.
Similarly, define s′′′ : 2[n]\P
s
6=∅ → R
[n]\P s
+ , by s
′′′
j (R
′) ,
∑
R∈R(R′,G−P s) s
′
j(R) for every j ∈
[n] \P s. As s′j ≡ sj for every j ∈ P s, we have that, similarly to the proof of Lemma 6(d), s′′′ is
a strategy profile in G − P s and hs′′′j = hs
′
j for every j ∈ [n] \ P s. By definition, we have that
hs
′′′
k = h
s′
k < h
R = h′R for every R′ ∈ 2[n]\P s6=∅ and k ∈ supp
(
s′′′(R′)
)
s.t. s′′′k (R
′) > s′′k(R
′), where
R ∈ R(R′, G − P s) s.t. k ∈ supp(s′(R)) and s′k(R) > sk(R) (there exists such R by definition
of R′). By the induction hypothesis (since P s 6= ∅ by definition), s′′′ = s′′, and so s′ = s and
the proof of Part a is complete.
The proof of Part b is very similar; the main difference is that in Eq. (2) we would have,
by hsj not being a plateau height of fj , that h
s′
j = fj(µ
s′
j ) > fj(µ
s
j) = h
s
j = hG ≥ hR
′
. The
remaining trivial differences between Parts a and b are left to the reader.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. We prove by full induction on n that in every n-resource selection game
G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
s.t. f1, . . . , fn are continuous, there exists a Nash equilibrium s s.t.
Maxj∈[n] hsj ≤ hG; from this claim, the existence of Nash equilibrium a fortiori follows (while
the existence of Nash equilibrium also follows from a theorem of Schmeidler (1973), we construc-
tively reprove it here via hydraulic analysis rather than a nonconstructive fixed-point theorem).
The theorem then follows by Theorem 3.3. Let n ∈ N and assume that the claim holds for all
smaller natural values of n. Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be an n-resource selection game.
By Lemma 7(a), there exists a strategy profile s′′ in the |PG|-resource selection game G′′ ,(
(fj)j∈PG ; (µ
R)
R∈2PG6=∅
)
s.t. hs
′′
j = hG for every j ∈ PG. By definition of Nash equilibrium, s′′
is a Nash equilibrium in G′′. If PG = [n], then s , s′′ is a Nash equilibrium as required, and
the proof of the induction step is complete. Assume, therefore, that PG ( [n]; hence, and since
PG 6= ∅ by Lemma 4, by the induction hypothesis there exists a Nash equilibrium s′ in the∣∣[n] \ PG∣∣-resource selection game G′ , G− PG, s.t. Maxj∈[n]\PG hsj ≤ hG′ .
We construct a strategy profile s in G as follows: s(R) , s′′(R) for every R ∈ 2PG6=∅ , and
for every R′ ∈ 2[n]\PG6=∅ , we pick
(
s(R)
)
R∈R(R′,G′) arbitrarily among the tuples satisfying s(R) ∈
µR ·∆R′ for every R ∈ R(R′, G′) and ∑R∈R(R′,G′) s(R′) = s′(R′). This is a well-defined strategy
profile in G since R′ = R \ PG ⊆ R for every R ∈ R(R′, G′) and R′ ∈ 2[n]\PG6=∅ , and by definition
of the player mass in G′ and G′′. By definition of s, we have that hsj = h
s′′
j for every j ∈ PG
and hsj = h
s′
j for every j ∈ [n] \ PG. Therefore, by definition of s′′ we have that hsj = hs
′′
j = hG
for every j ∈ PG, and by definition of s′ and by Lemma 7(b), we have that hsj = hs
′
j ≤ hG′ < hG
for every j ∈ [n] \ PG. Therefore, we have that hsj ≤ hG for every j ∈ [n].
We complete the proof by showing that s is a Nash equilibrium in G. For every R ∈ 2PG6=∅ ,
k ∈ supp(s(R)) ⊆ R and j ∈ R, we have by definition of s, s′′ that hsk = hs′′k = hG =
hs
′′
j = h
s
j . Let R ∈ 2[n]6=∅ \ 2PG6=∅ , k ∈ supp
(
s(R)
)
and j ∈ R. By definition of s, we have that
k ∈ supp(s′(R \ PG)) ⊆ 2[n]\PG6=∅ . If j ∈ [n] \ PG, then j ∈ R \ PG and by definition of s, s′ we
have that hsk = h
s′
k ≤ hs
′
j = h
s
j ; otherwise, i.e., if j ∈ PG, then by Lemma 7(b) and by definition
of s, s′, s′′ we have that hsk = h
s′
k ≤ h′G < hG = hs
′′
j = h
s
j . Either way, h
s
k ≤ hsj and the proof is
complete.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 5.2 from Section 5
Proof of Theorem 5.2. As in the main text, we prove only one direction, leaving the proof of
the other (trivial) direction to the reader. Assume that no fractional perfect marriage exists.
By Theorem 3.1, there exists a (strong) Nash equilibrium s in G. As no fractional perfect
marriage exists, by Lemma 8 we have that not all loads in s are 1. As by definition of G
the average of all loads in s is 1, we have that the highest load in s is greater than 1. By
Lemma 6(b), we therefore have hG > 1. Therefore, by definition there exists a set of pistons
S ∈ 2[n]6=∅ s.t. EG(S) > 1. As fj = id for all j ∈ S, we have, as in Remark 3 and by definition
of µR, that 1 < EG(S) = Equalizefj :j∈S
(∑
R∈2S6=∅ µ
R
)
=
∑
R∈2S6=∅
µR
|S| =
|{i∈[n]|Ri∈2S6=∅}|
|S| . As by
definition, R{i∈[n]|R
i∈2S6=∅} ⊆ S, we have that
∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] ∣∣ Ri ∈ 2S6=∅}∣∣∣> |S| ≥ ∣∣∣R{i∈[n]|Ri∈2S6=∅}∣∣∣, i.e.,
that |I| > |RI | for I , {i ∈ [n] ∣∣ Ri ∈ 2S6=∅}, as required.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 6.1 from Section 6, and Auxiliary Results
Definition 13. Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a resource selection game s.t. f1, . . . , fn are
continuous. We denote by hj(G) ∈ R the value hsj for every Nash equilibrium s in G.
Remark 10. hj(G) is well defined by Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
Lemma 18. Let G =
(
(fj)
n
j=1; (µ
R)R∈2[n]6=∅
)
be a resource selection game s.t. f1, . . . , fn are
continuous, and let S ⊆ [n]. For every j ∈ [n] \ S, hj(G− S) ≥ hj(G).
Remark 11. By Lemma 6(a,d), taking S , PG in Lemma 18 yields an equality.
Proof of Lemma 18. We prove the lemma by full induction on n.
(Outer induction) Step: Let n ∈ N and assume that the lemma holds for all smaller values
of n. We prove the (outer) induction step by full induction on n− |S|.
(Inner induction) Base: If S = [n], then the claim vacuously holds.
(Inner induction) Step: Let S ( [n] and assume that the (outer induction) step holds for all
S of larger cardinality. We consider two cases.
If S ⊇ PG, then by by Lemma 5(b), by the (outer) induction hypothesis (since PG 6= ∅ by
Lemma 4), and by Remark 11, we have hj(G− S) = hj
(
(G− PG)− (S \ PG)
) ≥ hj(G− PG) =
hj(G), as required.
Otherwise, i.e., if P ′ , PG \ S 6= ∅, we claim that hG−S ≥ hG. By Lemma 17, we have
that PG ∈ arg MaxS′∈DG EG(S′); in particular, PG ∈ DG. Since EG(PG) = hG ∈ R by Lem-
mas 4 and 17, we therefore have that M(PG) = ∅. Therefore, P ′ /∈ M(PG), and so there
exists µ ≤ ∑R∈2PG6=∅ \2PG\P ′6=∅ µR s.t. Equalizefk:k∈P ′(µ) = EG(PG). We note that 2PG6=∅ \ 2PG\P ′6=∅ ⊆
2S∪P ′6=∅ \ 2
(S∪P ′)\P ′
6=∅ =
⋃
R′∈2P ′6=∅ R(R
′, G − S), where the union is of disjoint sets; therefore,
µ ≤ ∑R∈2PG6=∅ \2PG\P ′6=∅ µR ≤ ∑R′∈2P ′6=∅∑R∈R(R′,G−S) µR. By Lemmas 1 and 3(b), we therefore
have that hG = EG(PG) = Equalizefk:k∈P ′(µ) ≤ Equalizefk:k∈P ′
(∑
R′∈2P ′6=∅
∑
R∈R(R′,G−S) µ
R
)
=
EG−S(P ′) ≤ hG−S , where the last inequality is by Lemma 15(b).
For every j ∈ PG−S , By Lemma 6(a,b), we have hj(G−S) = hG−S ≥ hG ≥ hj(G). For every
j ∈ [n]\(S∪PG−S), by Remark 11, by Lemma 5(b) and by the (inner) induction hypothesis (since
PG−S 6= ∅ by Lemma 4), we have hj(G−S) = hj
(
(G−S)−PG−S
)
= hj
(
G−(S∪PG−S)
) ≥ hj(G)
and the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 6.1. We prove that h1, . . . , hn are nondecreasing by full induction on n. Let
n ∈ N and assume that the claim holds for all smaller values of n. Let G = ((fj)nj=1; (µR)R∈2[n]6=∅)
be an n-resource selection game s.t. f1, . . . , fn are continuous, let R ∈ 2[n]6=∅, let µ′R > µR and let
G′ be the game obtained from G by increasing the mass of player type R from µR to µ′R.
By Lemma 15(b) and by Lemma 1, hG′ = MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG′(S) ≥ MaxS∈2[n]6=∅ EG = hG. There-
fore, by Lemma 6(a,b), hj(G
′) = hG′ ≥ hG = hj(G) for every j ∈ PG′ ; it therefore remains to
show that hj(G
′) ≥ hj(G) for every j ∈ [n] \ PG′ as well. Before we show this, we claim that
hj(G
′ − PG′) ≥ hj(G − PG′) for every j ∈ [n] \ PG′ ; to show this, we consider two cases. If
R ⊆ PG′ , then by definition G′ − PG′ = G− PG′ , and so hj(G′ − PG′) = hj(G− PG′) for every
j ∈ [n]\PG′ . Otherwise, i.e., if R\PG′ 6= ∅, then by definition G′−PG′ is the game obtained from
G−PG′ by increasing the mass of player type R\PG′ by µ′R−µR > 0. Therefore, by the induc-
tion hypothesis (since PG′ 6= ∅ by Lemma 4), we therefore have that hj(G′−PG′) ≥ hj(G−PG′)
for every j ∈ [n] \ PG′ in this case as well. Finally, by Remark 11 and Lemma 18, we therefore
have for every j ∈ [n] \ PG′ that hj(G′) = hj(G′ − PG′) ≥ hj(G− PG′) ≥ hj(G), and the proof
by induction is complete.
We move on to prove continuity of h1, . . . , hn; for simplicity, we show continuity only for
the case in which f1, . . . , fn are strictly increasing. W.l.o.g. we will show that h1 is continuous;
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let ε > 0. For every j ∈ [n], let µj(G) = f−1j
(
hj(G)
)
— this is the value µsj for every Nash
equilibrium s in G. By continuity of f1, there exists δ > 0 s.t.
∣∣f1(µ) − f1(µ1(G))∣∣ < ε for
every µ ∈ (µ1(G) − δ, µ1(G) + δ). Let µ′R ∈ (µR − δ, µR + δ) and denote by G′ the game
obtained from G by changing the mass of player type R from µR to µ′R. For every j ∈ [n], let
µj(G
′) = f−1j
(
hj(G
′)
)
. We first consider the case in which µ′R ≥ µR. In this case, as shown
above, for every j ∈ [n] we have that hj(G′) ≥ hj(G); as fj is increasing, therefore µj(G′) ≥
µj(G) for every such j. As
∑
j∈[n] µj(G
′) =
∑
R′∈2[n]6=∅\{R} µ
R′+µ′R =
∑
j∈[n] µj(G)+µ
′R−µR <∑
j∈[n] µj(G) + δ, we therefore have that µj(G) ≤ µj(G′) < µj(G) + δ for every j. In particular,
µ1(G) ≤ µ1(G′) < µ1(G) + δ, and so 0 ≤ h1(G′) − h1(G) = f1(µ1(G′)) − f1(µ1(G)) < ε, as
required. The case in which µ′R < µR is analogous.
The proof of Part b is virtually identical to that of the continuity of h1, . . . , hn, noticing
that we can choose δ = εK , where K is the Lipschitz constant of f1.
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